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PREFACE

This thesis grew out of a term paper for a Sociology of Development class. An
important aspect of that class involved the study of the transformation of the agricultural
sector in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries and more recent changes taking place
among peasants of developing nations.
The agricultural section intrigued me. Coming from a Canadian province where
50 percent of the population still made its living by farming I had some notion of the
organization of agricultural production in North America. I also was acquainted with the
agricultural settlement history of the Canadian great plains region. While the family
farmers I knew certainly differed from the peasants of pre-industrial Europe and of
today's developing nations they also exhibited some similarities.
Family farms were what their name implied - farms run by families, not by
individuals. Like peasant enterprises family farmers relied on the help of all their
immediate kin to get the work done. Like peasants, family farmers also drew on their
extended kin network for help during busy times. A farmer could expect, and indeed
relied on, help from his wife, his siblings and their family members, and from his
parents, if they were still healthy enough to participate.
Extended kin help speeded up seeding, harvest, cattle round-ups, and building
projects. During harvest, for instance, the men handled the machine. work but everyone
pitched in. The women cooked, brought food to the fields, and operated combines or
drove grain trucks to the elevator if things got insanely busy. Children old enough to help
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contributed according to their gender - boys on the machines, girls in the kitchen or
running errands.
A farmer's extended kin provided invaluable help. Kin "poverty" translated to
economic poverty for family farmers. Lack of extended kin help inhibited the family
farmer's ability to complete crucial work like seeding or harvest in a timely fashion and
hence lowered his return from his produce, e.g., frost-bitten grain gets the farmer a
lower grade at the elevator which, in turn, means a lower price.
At the same time I was reading about peasants and relating them to what I knew
about family farming the American family farm crisis was in the headlines. While I knew
Canadian farmers were experiencing economic difficulties their woes didn't seem quite
as severe as those of American family farmers. The rate of foreclosures in the American
mid-west eclipsed the economic concerns of Western Canadian grain farmers which still
centered mainly on freight rates, e.g., the "Crow rate", and low commodities prices.
Depending on who analyzed the increases in farm foreclosures, they were seen
either as the result of poor business management on the part of farmers or the
consequences of an unfair American government agricultural policy that put cheap food
ahead of the well-being of family farmers. The first line of argument took the tack that
farm foreclosures, if they weeded out poor managers, provided a boost to the agricultural
economy since Americans would be left with the most "efficient" producers and not have
to subsidize "inefficient" farmers. The alternative argument claimed that family farmers,
because the American government had always relied on a "cheap food policy" to mollify
consumers and increase agricultural exports, suffered under an unfair agricultural
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marketing system where they did not receive a fair price for their produce. Furthermore,
large corporate farmers, not family farmers, received the lion's share of government
agricultural subsidy payments even though they weren't in need of such help.
The American farm crisis caught my attention since it contained elements directly
related to "development". It raised questions of the place of family farmers in advanced,
capitalist economies. Although I had taken their existence for granted, according to many
development theoreticians, especially the neo-classical economists and the Marxists, these
labour units comprised an anomaly in market economies. By any stretch of the
imagination they should have disappeared years ago, replaced by larger units organized
completely on for-profit or, depending on your perspective, capitalist principles.
So I decided to look more closely at American family farmers and especially at
farm foreclosures. The sociological literature was sparse and speculative. Most of it
remained at the theoretical level and what empirical work existed concentrated on
historical developments in the country as a whole. There was little examination of
existing agricultural census data and, with the exception of Patrick Mooney's research
on Wisconsin farmers, no in-depth, qualitative work on the situation of American family
farmers.
The paper for the development class comprised little more than a literature review
and an outline of areas in need of research. I chose one of those areas, the lack of indepth analysis of regional patterns of development in American agriculture, as the major
focus of this thesis. I specifically wanted to ascertain if trends in American agriculture
as a whole since 1920 have been uniform across the country of if there are significant
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regional variations in the strategies and situations of American family farmers. What
follows is an examination of agriculture in two American states, North Dakota and
Illinois, from 1920 to 1987.
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INTRODUCTION
Family farmers have been much in the news of late. If one is to believe the
rhetoric of some American politicians, "the family farm" is a hallowed American
institution that must be preserved at all costs. However, neither the news reports or the
politicians ever tell us exactly who family farmers are. Who are we trying to save? Who
gets classified as a family farmer and why? We need to know what these farmers do and
how this distinguishes them from other groups who are involved in agriculture, such as
peasants, plantation agriculturalists, or capitalist agriculturalists.

Peasants. Family Farmers. and Capitalist Farmers:
from Subsistence Production to Production for Profit

American agriculture never went through a "peasant" phase as did agriculture in
Europe. Rather patterns of landholding and agricultural production have always been
integrated to a large degree into a market economy (Buttell 1980; Mann and Dickinson
1980; Vogeler 1977). Three patterns of landholding and agricultural production emerged
irt the United States. The first was the family farm which was owned and operated by
one family and was relatively small in size. This type of farm organization still
characterizes the northern and midwestern states. Plantation agriculture typified the South
where ownership of large tracts of land resided in the hands of a few who relied on
slaves for labour power. After the abolition of slavery agriculture in the south moved
towards a hired labour basis. The southwest exhibited a "capitalist" type of agriculture
early on in its development. Here large land-owners have always depended on hired
labour for production. Hispanics and Asians made up a large portion of this farm labour

pool. Hispanics continue to comprise the bulk of the agricultural labour force in states
like California, Arizona, and Texas.
"Classic" peasant agriculturalists, such as existed in Europe during the middle
ages and still exist in some of the developing nations of the 20th century, produce
primarily for their own personal consumption with market production a minor concern.
Peasants, like farmers, operate in a state-controlled political contexts. Although
researchers often consider peasants an undifferentiated group, there are important
distinctions within the peasantry centering on ownership of land and level of integration
into the market (Wolf 1973:xiv). However, for the purposes of this paper it is enough
to distinguish peasants from farmers.
The important distinction between peasants and farmers according to Wolf (1973)
centers on goals. He argues that the major aim of peasants is, "subsistence and social
status gained within a narrow range of social relationships" whereas farmers, "participate
fully in the market and ... commit themselves to a status game within a wide social
network" (1973:xiv). The differences between farmers and peasants blur when peasants
are drawn into producing more heavily for the market. However, distinctions also need
to be made when examining farmers in capitalist economies. Just as all peasants are not
alike, so all farmers are not alike. In market economies like the United States there are
-
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at least two types of farmers: family farmers and capitalist farmers. 1
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Mooney (1982) makes a good argument for the existence of a third class of farmers he
calls, "propertied labourers". These farmers own some of their means of production, e.g., land
and machinery, but they work under contract to large agribusiness corporations who control
parts of the agricultural production process such as when and what to plant, what chemicals to
use on the crops, and who the farmer can sell his finished product to. He also identifies "parttime family farmers" as farm families who fulfill Buttel's requirements of owning some or all
of their land and who rely on family labour to get the farm work done but who derive half or
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Buttel (1980: 10) defines family labour farms as those enterprises in which the
agricultural producer, or family, holds formal title to most or all of the land and to the
capital employed in production. The producer has entrepreneurial control over these
instruments of production and can dispose of them at his/her discretion. The farm is
largely, or fully commercial, exchanging commodities for goods on the market and most
or all of the family's livelihood derives from farm income and farm produced
commodities. Buttel (1980: 10) labels family farmers in market economies "independent
commodity producers". Family farming, as defined by Buttel, is an historically rooted
phenomenon. It represents a form of agricultural production that appeared in Europe after
feudalism and in Europe's western colonies, the United States, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand.
Capitalist farmers, like family farmers, own some or all of their land but they
produce entirely for the market. Capitalist farmers differ from family labour farmers in
that they rely primarily on hired labour to get their farm work done rather than family
labour. In addition, capitalist farmers are much more likely to derive considerable income
from sources not directly connected to the farm, e.g., agricultural service enterprises,
and to be "vertically integrated" in their operations, meaning they control all phases of
their production process from the input stage of fertilizer, seed, and other chemical
additives to the output stage of marketing.

more of their income from off-farm income, usually in the form of wage labour of the wife,
husband or both spouses.
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By the late 1980's many family farmers in the United States were in big financial
trouble. The rate of farm foreclosures in the had reached proportions rivalling that of the
1930's. A 1987 journalistic report indicated in that year alone financial institutions
foreclosed on U.S. farms at the rate of 2000 per week (Pugh 1987:7). The majority of
these foreclosures were on family farms. At this rate (104,000 per year) family farmers
are indeed an "endangered species". If the 1987 trend continues the number of family
farms in the U.S. will decline from the present 1,809,324 to 769,324 by 1997.
While most see the recent spate of farm foreclosures as unequalled in American
agriculture the historical record shows decreases in farm numbers are the rule rather than
the exception. The movement of American farmers off the land is not a phenomena of
the 1980's but rather an ongoing trend. Farm numbers have been declining ever since
1935. From 1935 to 1987 the number of farms in the United States decreased by two
thirds, falling from six and one-half million farms in 1935 to about two million farms in
1987 (U.S. Census of Agriculture 1935; 1987). This represents a 300 percent decrease
in 67 years.
In spite of the declining numbers of family farms, the 198'72 agricultural census
data showed individual or family farms still dominated U.S. agriculture and constituted
87 percent of all farms. Still, between 1920 and 1987 the number of farms declined by
4,360,584, a 68 percent decrease in 67 years. The rate of decrease appears most severe
between 1954 and 1974 where the decreases between censuses is never less than 13
percent, and the overall decrease during this period is 52 percent.
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1987 is the most recent U.S. agricultural census data available.
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Although the amount of land in farms has remained relatively constant since 1935
the average size of farms increased from 148 acres in 1920 to 462 acres in 1987 (U.S.
Census of Agriculture 1920; 1987). In 1920, one in three Americans lived on farms
while in 1977 this figure dropped to one in 28, or 3.6 percent of the population (Vogeler
1981:3). Between 1920 and 1977 net outmigration from farms totalled 48.7 million
people.
These rural migrants represent three major groups. The first group is composed
the children of farmers or small-town residents. Many children of farmers cannot stay
in rural areas because they do not have enough money or land to begin farming or have
no other job opportunities in the area. Some of these young people also choose to leave
the farm for an urban lifestyle. The second group is comprised of retired farmers who
have either sold their farms or have left them to younger sons.
The third group represents a growing number of younger farmers. Some of these
farmers are the ones who are so much in the news today - the victims of farm
foreclosures. Some others are undoubtedly farmers who finally gave up what they saw
as a futile attempt to maintain themselves on the land. They "packed it up and moved to
town 11 , as the saying goes in rural Saskatchewan.
The current crisis of American family farmers needs to be seen in the context of
the larger political economy. The growth of U.S. agribusiness since the 19th century and
the various wars the U.S. has engaged in since the Civil War have had tremendous
effects on the structure of the agrarian sector.
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Looking initially at agribusiness, the process of agribusiness encroachment into
family farming can be divided into three stages (Havens 1985). The first stage, from
1860 to 1900, consisted of gaining control of the "output" phase of agriculture - the
marketing and processing of agricultural products. During this period family farmers lost
control of the marketing of their products because of two developments. First, agrarian
capitalists and the U.S. government worked together to open national and international
markets to American agricultural commodities and tied family farmers to world prices
over which they had little control. Second, the railroad companies and food processing
companies such as millers, meat-packers, and canneries established themselves as the
middlemen through which farmers had to market their products nationally.
The second stage, from 1900 to 1950, involved growing incursions of agribusiness
into the "input" phase of agriculture. During this period family farmers grew increasingly
dependent on agribusiness firms for the "raw" materials of farming such as seed,
fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides and for the "tools of the trade" such as farm machinery.
Farmers effectively lost control over a significant portion of their means of production.

It is also during this period that the U.S. federal government most actively encouraged
farmers to step up agricultural production to meet the wartime needs of Europe during
WWI and WWII. Farmers responded admirably but had to mechanize to make up for
increased production demands and the shortage of agricultural labour· occassioned by the
war.
From 1950 to the present agribusiness firms have pushed into the actual
production phase of agriculture. Some firms operate their own production enterprises
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such as livestock feedlots and chicken farms. Others, especially canneries, engage in
product contracts in which they supply farmers with inputs like seed and pesticides while
in return the farmer plants, cultivates, and harvests the crop, selling it to the company
for an agreed upon price.
Each of these phases had particular consequences for family farmers. However,
it is the first two that have led to what is often referred to as the "cost-price squeeze" of
farming. I want to briefly present the history of this situation as a lens through which
declining farm numbers should be viewed. I look first at loss of control over outputs
followed by the loss of control over inputs.

Losing Control of the Output Phase:
The Emergence of Markets and Agribusiness Middlemen

In their historical analyses of U.S. agriculture Havens (1985) and Howe (1982)
examine farmers loss of control over the marketing of their products. Howe (1982)
details the consequences of the development of national and international agricultural
markets had for farmers. Beginning in 1850 the newly developed American rail
transportation system created a national agricultural market, as opposed to regional
markets. At the same time developments in the shipping industry allowed large capitalist
farmers to open up international agricultural markets. For the first time, farmers found
themselves at the mercy of a large, unpredictable market with no power to affect prices.
Havens (1985) documents the incursions of capitalist business enterprises into the
agricultural sphere from the late nineteenth century to the present. In concert with the
development of unpredictable markets large companies began moving into the processing
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and marketing stages of agricultural production. Consequently, grain, railway, and food
processing companies came to mediate between farmers and consumers. As capitalist
food industries became increasingly concentrated and centralized, farmers had no choice
but to deal with a few large companies that controlled the markets.
The above intrusions of capitalists into agriculture has resulted in agricultural
output industries processing and marketing the vast majority of farm products produced
today. Agribusiness firms buy from the farmer and significantly affect the price farmers
get for their produce. The "price" industries include marketing, food processing and
manufacturing, food wholesaling, and food retailing. These firms also show a high
degree of centralization. In 1979, 44 companies received 68 per cent of all food
processing revenues. Likewise, 44 companies received all wholesale and retail food
distribution revenues (Havens 1985:30). A mere 10 companies received more than 80
percent of the revenues in cereal grains, dairy products, bakery products, meat, canned
goods, beer, fruits, and nuts (Havens 1985:30).
This control of the output phase of agricultural production by "cost" industries is
not unique to agriculture. Primary industries like mining, lumbering, and fishing
experience the same loss of control over pricing their products. Farmers, however, have
also become increasingly dependent on producers of agricultural "inputs". Because of the
increasingly technical and specialized nature of modem agriculture, farmers rely heavily
on production inputs such as machinery, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, chemical
fertilizers, and seed. Farmers' greater dependence on inputs increases their vulnerability
to a cost-price squeeze. Marxists present evidence suggesting that since the beginning of
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the 20th century increasing capitalist control of the input phase of agriculture (e.g.)
machinery, fertilizer, pesticides, etc., of farming has further exacerbated farmers'
economic condition.

Losing Control of the Input Phase:
Mechanization of Farming and Scientific Developments in Production
Farm input industries supply the technology for modem agriculture such as feed,
fertilizers, chemicals, seeds, and farm machinery. They determine a large part of the
farmer's costs of production. From the early 20th century to the present these
agribusiness inputs have increased in both importance and price and adversely affected
family farmers.
Key 19th century inventions in railroad and steamship transportation, and agricultural
machinery fundamentally affected American agriculture as did the 20th century
developments of electrical power, automobiles, and the gasoline engine. However, not
all farmers adopted the new technologies equally quickly or to the same extent. Instead
these inventions provided a competitive edge to the small numbers of farmers that could
adopt them at the outset. The "progressive" farms pushed out smaller producers who
were unable to match the increased productive capacity and cheaper prices of their larger
rivals (Havens 1985: 10).
Ehrensaft (1980) and Havens (1985) argue innovations affected small independent
farm producers in ways similar to the effects of industrial innovations on small
manufacturers. Those farmers who could afford the mechanical innovations (the
agricultural capitalists and the wealthier independent farmers) adopted the new
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technologies and their increased production in turn lowered prices for all. This forced
poorer farmers to adopt the technology just to stay in business but to do so they had to
go into debt.
Those farmers who could not obtain the credit to mechanize tried to compensate by
increasing their labour time and intensity. Eventually even that was not enough and they
could no longer make a living by farming. They faced the choice of leaving agriculture
or falling into rural impoverishment. Many of them left, swelling the ranks of the urban
labour force.
The "technological treadmill" initiated in the late 19th continues to influence U.S.
agriculture. Havens (1985) feels that agricultural innovations whether in the form of
machinery or chemical inputs, reward wealthier farmers since they are the first to
innovate and the first to benefit from increased yields. When other farmers adopt the new
technology overproduction occurs and produces falling prices. Because poorer farmers
have to go into debt to adopt new technology, the price falls affect them particularly
severely. They must therefore increase outputs even more to counter the debts, and that,
in turn, drops prices even further. Only increases in demand, created by a new cycle of
investment in the economy or a war economy, can increase agricultural commodities
prices.
Ehrensaft's (1980) examination of the effect of the gasoline tractor provides a good
example of the uneven development produced by technological innovations in agriculture.
Specialized horse-drawn machinery (drill seeders, hinged harrows) had been developed
by the 1830's but were in limited use until the 1850's. From then on until 1896
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agricultural prices declined regularly and persistently as production increased and
surpluses emerged
The 1880's and 1890's saw the adoption of the gasoline tractor by a small group of
innovators, presumably wealthy farmers attempting to increase production. From 1896
to 1914 the demand for .agricultural products expanded as a result of immigration and
W.W.I.

As the price upswing continued, adoption of tractors became widespread,

increasing from 4,000 in 1911, to 246,000 in 1920, and to 920,000 in 1930 (Ehrensaft
1980:75). Less wealthy farmers also got tractors in order to compete with the innovators,
but they missed out on the windfall profits when prices began to fall by 1920.
However, mechanization was not the only input innovation that adversely affected
family farmers. The development of agricultural innovations such as pesticides,
herbicides, chemical fertilizers, hybridization, and cross-breeding also played a part.
Advances in these products continued throughout the 20th century. Family farmers,
however, adopted them unevenly with the majority of farmers buying innovations only
when general economic conditions improved. By 1920 commercial fertilizer was in
general use and from 1920 to 1930 the number of tractors and combines in use increase
73 per cent and 93 per cent respectively (Havens 1982:22).
The 1930's ushered in an array of changes, including cross-breeding in hogs and
hybrid seed com. But it was not until the economy improved with W.W.11 that new
machinery, hybrid seeds and petrochemical inputs came into common use. All of these
led to dramatic increases in production. The new production processes kept food prices
low and allowed the release of surplus agricultural labour for military service and work
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in the industrial and service sector (Havens 1985:23). By the 1950's, however,
commodities prices had declined drastically, forcing more family farmers off the land.
Over the past four decades these "cost" industries have become highly centralized
(Martinson and Campbell 1980:230,231). This centralization has reduced competition and
created astronomical escalations in prices. Between 1967 and 1979 the cost of fertilizer
increased by 80 percent, gasoline by 300 per cent, machinery and equipment by 120
percent, and pesticides by 250 percent (Havens 1985:28). Not surprisingly, the most
highly centralized sectors - herbicides/pesticides and petroleum products - registered the
greatest increases (Martinson and Campbell 1980:230).
The squeeze that "cost" industries and "price" industries place on farmers has
intensified because some agribusiness companies have vertically integrated to control all
phases of the agricultural production process. The Cargill grain company provides an
example of vertical integration that combines both input and output phases. Cargill not
only markets grain for American and Canadian farmers but sells them seed, fertilizers,
pesticides, and herbicides as well (Mitchell 1972:48). Campbell's and Green Giant have
united crop production, processing, and marketing activities They not only process and
market vegetables but also engage in part of the crop production via contract farming.
The company supplies farmers with seed, pesticides, and herbicides. In tum the farmer
plants, cultivates, and harvests the crop and agrees to sell it only to that company at a
specified price (Pfeffer 1985a).
Therefore, the 20th century process of technological innovation which was
accelerated by two world wars and the Korean War, along with the earlier 19th century
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loss of market control, due to agrarian and industrial capital accumulation, placed
American farmers in a highly dependent position. Farmers became caught in a "costprice" squeeze between suppliers of farm inputs and the marketers and processors of
agricultural outputs. The increasingly monopolistic and oligopolistic character of
agribusiness firms aggravated the squeeze.
Centralization and concentration in the farm output and input sectors has also
affected farm incomes negatively and contributed significantly to forcing marginal
farmers out of business and poorer farmers into debt (Martinson and Campbell
1980:234). A few agribusiness firms have come to dominate the farm output and input
sectors. Because of this oligopolistic nature of agribusiness family farmers face a highly
asymmetric interdependence with markets and are easily exploited by agribusiness.
Given the relentlessness of the cost-price squeeze it is rather surprising family
farmers still exist in capitalist economies. While the common perception of the current
crisis in agriculture is that it is affecting family farmers across the nation in the same
way there is little data to support this notion. Economic and sociological analyses of the
crisis tend to rely on gross, national statistics to generalize about farmers in all regions
of the country. To date there have been no comparisons of the predicament of farmers
in different regions of the country so it is unclear if some farmers are faring better than
others. If some are why is this the case, and conversely, if some aren't faring better,
why not.
The purpose of this paper is to make just such a comparison and to do so over
time. I have chosen two states for this analysis, North Dakota and Illinois. While both

14

states are considered "mid-western" they are located in two different ecological zones and
produce different agricultural commodities. North Dakota is part of the northern great
plains. It's climate is arid with severely cold winters and dry, hot summers. Except for
river valley areas the soils are light and highly susceptible to erosion by blowing or runoff. North Dakota is primarily a wheat and cattle state. In contrast, Illinois is part of the
long-grass prairie zone. It has a milder climate than North Dakota, the winters are not
as cold or as long, and the average rainfall is significantly higher. The soils are heavier
and hence richer and not as subject to degradation by erosion. Illinois farmers
concentrate their production in com, soybeans, and hogs although the cattle industry has
been growing in the state since the 1920's.
A theoretical chapter follows this introduction. It presents the major paradigms
sociologists use to examine agricultural development in advanced, capitalist economies.
Three models of agricultural development dominate the sociological literature: an
explanation closely following the lines of neo-classical economic theory; a traditional
Marxist explanation; and a "revisionist" Marxist model, a dependency interpretation that
draws from Chayanovian and more recent anthropological explications of peasant
agriculture.
A literature review is included as the third chapter. The fourth chapter, the data
chapter, presents the regional data I have used to examine the competing explanations of
the development of American agriculture. I describe the numerical agricultural patterns
in these regions by looking at numbers of farms, size of farms, tenure of ownership,
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amount of off-farm work, type of farm organization, and type of farm production in
terms of agricultural commodities raised.
In Chapter V, the conclusion, I evaluate the explanatory power of these models.
My evaluation lies primarily at the "numbers" level, relying on agricultural census data
to delineate the evolution of agriculture from 1920 to 1987 in North Dakota and Illinois.
However, I have also drawn on Hiram Drache's interviews with mid-western corporate
farmers and personal knowledge of my "family farmer" relatives for part of my
interpretation of the survival strategies of American farmers.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIV~ ON FAMILY LABOUR FARMS
IN CAPITALIST ECONOMIES

In the United States farmers remaining on the land comprise three groups:
individual farmers, farmers in partnerships, and corporate farmers. While one tends to
think of partnerships and corporate enterprises as non-family enterprises the agricultural
census data indicates most partnerships and farm corporations are family "businesses".
Partnerships generally involve father/son or sibling combinations. Although legally listed
as corporations, most family farm corporations have less than ten shareholders all of
whom are related by blood or marriage.
Sociologists have focused increasing attention on farmers and their economic.and
social conditions. While much of the recent research has concerned itself with farm
foreclosures there is a growing body of data on farmers who survive and their strategies
for survival. Sociologists have used three theoretical models to explain why some farmers
fail and some survive. Those favouring a neo-classical economic approach write off farm
failures as examples of poor business management. Conversely they credit farmers who
survive with superior management skills as well as greater than average initiative and
foresight.
Marxist sociologists and economists portray failed farmers as victims of increasing
monopoly capitalism. In capitalist economies farmers, like other small business people,
are pushed out by larger enterprises who can produce more cheaply. Marxists believe
some family farmers will eventually form an agricultural bourgeoisie relying on hired
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labour while others will enter the ranks of the hired farm labour the new bourgeoisie will
require. They will become part of the rural proletariat.
A third group of researchers takes a "bottom up" approach and attempts to explain
the strategies of family farmers in the context of their particular environmental,
economic, and social setting. This type of explanation, first advocated by an early 20th
century Russian agricultural economist, Alexander Chayanov, was revived by
anthropologists and sociologists studying peasants in developing nations in the 1960's and
1970's. More recently it has been applied by some rural sociologists to family farmers
industrialized nations with capitalist economies.
In this chapter I examine each of these theoretical approaches to farming under
capitalism economic structures. I begin with the neo-classical economics approach, move
on to the "traditional" Marxist arguments, and end with a discussion of the more specific
"Chayanovian" approach.

"Farmers Mean Business": Neo-Classical Economists' Aru,roaches to Family Farms

Among most North American agricultural economists, viewing farms as rural
businesses has dominated the study of family farm organization.

All the economic

categories used for business analysis, i.e., capital, rent, wages - are used in attempts to
compute farm profits for different sorts of farm organization. In the 1920's agricultural
economists stated that a farm could not be considered a success unless it met all the
requirements of a successful business - paying its operating expenses, receiving a current
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mortgage rate of interest on capital, and receiving a fair return for the farmer's labour
and management.
This type of analysis has continued even though then, as now, the data on family
labour farms does not conform very well to this conceptual mode. Family labour farms
exhibit clear differences from capitalist farms. For instance, they rely mostly on family
labour, not hired labour; family labour farmers rarely make what economists would
consider an "average rate of profit" on their endeavours yet unlike businesses which must
conform to this "average rate" of profit or face bankruptcy, family labour farms
generally operate well below this norm or even at a loss and still manage to survive.
One researcher found that in the three Iowa counties he studied, over one half of
the farms made nothing for the farmer's labour and failed to make five per cent interest
on their capital in addition to operating expenses (Durrenberger 1984:6). Yet these farms
continued to operate.
Researchers in agricultural colleges have never attempted to explain this
phenomenon. Plunging ahead with their application of business analysis to farms they
reasoned that developing and improving agriculture required the same kind of research
and development as that in industry. Their ultimate goal has been the same as that for
industry - increased productivity.
In achieving this goal agricultural colleges have been highly successful. Vast
supplies of cheap agricultural commodities have become the hallmark of American
agriculture. However, agricultural economists failed to address the questions of family
farm organization as it is actually practiced. As such their research has done very little
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to ensure farmers of an adequate return for their labour, or as it turns out, consumers a
quality food product for their dollar.
"Farming as a business" sociologists follow their economics counterparts and
argue that free enterprise in agriculture without government interference will result in the
lowest cost, highest-quality products for the consumer (Drache 1976; Vogeler 1981:7).
They view competition among family farmers as a necessity for fair prices, and in the
long run as beneficial to farmers since it helps them move up the "agricultural ladder"
from tenant to part-owner to full-owner by re-investing their "profits" in land and
equipment.
Agricultural economists' and sociologists of their persuasion standard explanation
of those farmers who fail in this type of economy places the blame squarely on the
individual. Family farmers fail because of their own shortcomings - they are not
innovative enough, they don't manage efficiently, or they don't work hard enough (c.f.,
Drache 1976, Chapters V, VI, and VII). Those who survive are the most efficient
producers because they innovate and manage carefully. Because they are efficient they
produce the most food for the least cost. Most researchers following the neo-classical
approach assume the continued existence of family farmers under capitalism since free
competition will supposedly prevent large-scale enterprise from dominating of the
agricultural sector.
In opposition to this view of family farmers is that of Marxist economists. Like
agricultural economists most Marxists categorize family farms as "small businesses" but
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they predict the ultimate ruin of these small producers as capitalism progresses. It is to
this explanation of the demise of family farms that I tum next.
"Dweasantization": Marxist Explanations for the Decline of Family Labour Farms

Most Marxist explanations of the demise of family farmers simply apply the
classical Marxian formula for capitalist development to the agricultural sector (Davis
1980; Ehrensaft 1980; Goss et al. 1980; Lenin 1967). As capitalism progresses and takes
on more of a monopoly character, they argue, it eventually forces small commodity
producers, whether they be family farmers, artisans, or other petit bourgeoisie producers,
into either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie and class polarization becomes complete.
Again this model comes from an industrial paradigm. Classical Marxists conceive of
family farmers as no different from small businessmen and therefore expect them to
suffer the same fate at the hands of larger business enterprises.
Like the research of western agricultural economists the research of classical
Marxists rests not on careful fieldwork - sociological, that is - documenting the actual
economic and social organization of family farms, but on their interpretation of aggregate
statistical data. This gross data does not reflect regional variations in the situation of
family farmers, nor does it document the individual strategies farmers adopt to survive
in a capitalist economy.
Most of these analyses draw heavily on the conceptual framework established by
Lenin when he examined Russian agriculture in the late 19th century. A description of
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Lenin's framework, therefore, subsumes many of the contemporary Marxist theoretical
approaches to family labour farms in North America.
Lenin's examination of late 19th century agricultural statistics for Russian
zemtsvos led him to the conclusion that the mass of the Russian peasantry, like other
small commodity producers, was losing control over the means of production, i.e., land,
horses, etc., and being turned into wage labourers while a small number of peasants were
able to grow larger and eventually transform their family labour farms into capitalist
enterprises relying primarily on wage labour.
Lenin, following Marx, argues that the development of commodity production and
capitalism leads to the social division of labour in which various forms of the processing
of non-agricultural materials are separated out from agricultural activities. These
processing activities become independent sectors of industry which exchange their
products for the products of agriculture. The industrial population begins to grow faster
than the agricultural population, and many agrarian residents are pulled into the industrial
sector.
In capitalist production the basis for the formation of the "home market" - the
exchange of commodities between different sectors of the economy - is the process of the
disintegration of small cultivators into either agricultural entrepreneurs or wage workers.
This Lenin refers to as the "differentiation" of the peasantry. As commodity production
penetrates further into crop cultivation the competition among agriculturalists - the
struggle for land and for economic independence - becomes keener and the middle and
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poor peasants are ousted from their land by the more well-to-do peasants (Lenin
1967:76).
Lenin argued that putting the Russian peasant into the situation of commodity
production completely subordinated peasants to the market, making them dependent on
it for personal consumption, for farming inputs (machinery, fuel, etc.), for marketing of
products, and for payment of taxes. In tum, the socio-economic relations of the peasantry
became subject to all the contradictions inherent in every commodity economy and every
order of capitalism.
There was competition, a struggle for economic independence, grabbing of land,
the concentration of production in the hands of a few and the forcing of the majority into
the proletariat, and the exploitation of the majority through the medium of the middleman (merchant's capital) and the expropriation of surplus-value from workers (hiring of
farm labourers) (Lenin 1967: 175). Lenin predicted "depeasantization . . . the utter
dissolution of the old, patriarchal peasantry and the creation of new types of rural
inhabitants" (1967: 176) as the end result of the economic contradictions in this capitalist
agricultural economy .
For Lenin, the starting point of the differentiation process is the emergence of
property inequality. Differentiation can emerge only when the peasant finds himself in
a money-rent situation, as opposed to a labour-rent or rent-in-kind situation. With labourrent the possibility of differentiation among the peasantry doesn't exist. The peasant owns
his means of production, working part of the week on his own land and part of the week
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on the landlord's. The peasant can't acquire much surplus from his production because
the product from the lord's land goes only to the lord.
If the peasant pays rent-in-kind he produces the entire product and gives the land-

owner a certain amount of the surplus. But he can acquire a certain surplus over and
above the amount needed for his necessities. The peasant who acquires more produce can
have a higher standard of living than his poorer counterpart but since he cannot acquire
more land with his surplus, differentiation remains at the level of goods only. Although
this situation holds the seeds of differentiation it can only develop fully with a moneyrent situation.
Money-rent, in which the peasant substitutes money for rent-in-kind, is possible
only when commerce, urban industry, and commodity production have developed. These
conditions transform the traditional common-law relationship between peasant and
landlord into a cash, contract-based relationship. Money-rent allows those peasants who
have been able to acquire a significant amount of surplus to buy their land. These more
prosperous peasants can then exploit agricultural day-labourers for their own profit. In
this way they can accumulate enough wealth to transform themselves into capitalists.
Lenin believed differentiation primarily pushes middle-peasants off the land. They
lose both in class and status as they were forced into urban industries. These peasants
generally make most of their income in farming but in bad years resort to loans or wage
work to keep solvent. Every crop failure results in masses of middle peasants seeking
wage work. The middle peasants fluctuate between the wealthy, would-be-capitalist
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peasants and the rural proletariat. Only a few of them are lucky enough to make it into
the ranks of the new rural bourgeoisie; the rest fall into the industrial or rural proletariat.
The class of capitalist farmers that is created from the wealthy peasants requires
a larger labour force than the family so they employ landless labourers. The spare cash
they obtain is either put into commercial operations or usury, or invested in land
purchases, farm improvements, etc. The small, allotment holding peasants either lose
their allotment entirely or find it impossible to make a living off pure farming activities.
They are forced into wage-work for the bulk of their livelihood and become a rural
proletariat.
The differentiation of the peasantry creates a home-market for capitalism. There
is growth in personal consumption among the rural proletariat because they must now
purchase on the market what they once produced for themselves on their farms. The rural
bourgeoisie create a market for the means of production, i.e., machinery, and other
farming inputs, and for personal consumption because their affluence leads to an
expansion of their personal requirements.
Although Lenin did not claim to know the rate of differentiation for the Russian
peasantry or even if differentiation was progressing, he still felt that the general statistics
on the rural economy at that time supported his view of an uninterrupted and rapidly
increasing differentiation (Lenin 1967: 185). He argued that the middle peasants were
abandoning or selling their land and "fleeing" to the towns while the two extreme groups,
the rural bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat, stayed in the countryside. He predicted
this reaction in agriculture wherever capitalism became the dominant mode of production.
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Conceptual Inaw,ropriateness of Neo-classical Economic and
Classical Marxists Approaches to Family Labour Farms

Lenin's interpretation, and the interpretations of those who use a similar
framework for analyzing change in agriculture suffer from the grossness of the data used.
Agriculture in any country, and especially in large countries like the U.S.S.R., Canada,
and the U.S.A., is subject to regional variations that produce different economic and
social strategies among family farmers. The economic conditions of the North American
wheat belt, for instance, have produced different social and political reactions from
farmers than have the conditions of the midwestem U.S. com belt. Capitalism does not
appear to affect these farmers in exactly the same way. At a more elementary level,
different environmental conditions alone have produced unique coping strategies at both
the economic and social levels in these areas.
The other problem with both the Western agricultural economists' explanations
and the Marxists' explanations of family farmers is their neglect of the family nature of
the enterprise. The economists classify family farmers purely as businessmen out to make
a profit. Marxists, although recognizing these units as family labour farms never deal
with the actual organization of the unit. They prefer, instead, to concentrate on the
demise of the farmers and what happens when these people are forced out of farming,
e.g,, the effect of masses of landless rural peasants flocking to urban areas.
An alternative framework for understanding family labour farms is offered by the
Chayanovian approach, recently rehabilitated by anthropologists and sociologists studying
peasants in developing nations. In contrast to both the "farming as a business" approach
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and the Marxist predictions of the polarization of the peasantry, Chayanov and those
using his theories, concentrate on the differences between family farming enterprises and
capitalist farming enterprises. They also recognize the regional variations in the economic
and social strategies of family labour farmers.

Chayanov's Understanding of the Family Labour Farm Under Capitalism

Alexander Chayanov was a Russian economist who, along with his students,
conducted years of fieldwork with Russian peasants, studying their economic and social
organization in different regions of the country during the late 19th and early 20th
century. Chayanov argued that peasants cannot be understood in solely entrepreneurial
terms or in terms of traditional Marxist class categories. Chayanov began an analysis of
peasant agriculture from below. He was more interested in delineating the operational
logic of family farms rather than looking at the national and international flow of
resources, goods and demands, i.e., how peasants fit into the larger political economy
(Shanin 1986:3).
Chayanov classified the peasant farm as a family labour unit. As such it differed
from typical business enterprises in that it lacked an essential economic category, that of
wages. In the economic theory of capitalist society the categories of price, capital,
wages, interest, and rent determine one another and are functionally interdependent.
But, Chayanov argued, if any one of these categories is absent from an economic unit
"then all the others lose their specific character and conceptual content and cannot even
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be defined quantitatively" (1986:4). If an economic structure lacks any one of these
categories then none of the other categories can be applied to it in their usual meaning.
Such is the case, argued Chayanov, with the family labour farm. Since it lacks
the category of wages, it becomes impossible to impose on this structure the other
categories of net profit, rent, and interest on capital "as real economic categories in the
capitalist meaning of the work" (Chayanov 1986:5). Rather than making a profit, or
receiving a loss, from its activities the peasant or artisan family running their own
"business" receives as a result of a year's work, a gross product, which when exchanged
on the market, forms the gross product of the economic unit. They subtract outlays on
materials from the gross product and are left with their labour product. This is, states
Chayanov, the only possible category of income for family economic enterprises and it
cannot be broken down either analytically or subjectively. However, family farmers
suffer a further handicap from family businesses. Unlike family businesses, e.g., family
stores, etc., many family farmers receive the bulk payment for their year's work annually
when they sell their crops. 1
In family enterprises the amount of labour product is mainly determined by the
size and composition of the working family, the number of its members capable of
working, the productivity of the labour unit, and the degree of labour effort. Chayanov
defines the degree of labour effort as " the degree of self-exploitation through which the

1

The timing and regularity of payments for farm produce differs depending, of course, on
the type of product. Those farmers most disadvantaged in this respect are cash grain farmers
who receive their money only after they have harvested their crop. Dairy farmers and mixed
farmers have a more regular income throughout the year.
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working members effect a certain quantity of labour units in the course of the year"
(1986:6).
The degree of self-exploitation is determined by an equilibrium between family
demand satisfaction and the "drudgery of labour". Every increase in unit of income is
evaluated by the family from two viewpoints: first by its importance for consumption and
second in terms of the degree of effort or "drudgery" it takes to earn the extra money.
As goods increase from the family's work the subjective evaluation of each new
dollar's significance for consumption decreases, but, the drudgery of working for it
increases. Therefore, the family labourers will work only to the extent that "an
equilibrium is reached between the drudgery, or work, and the significance of the needs
for whose satisfaction the labour is endured" (Chayanov 1986:6).
The point at which this equilibrium between drudgery and demand satisfaction is
reached is changeable. It depends firstly on the conditions (environmental, topographical,
etc.) under which the farm operates, its market situation, and the farm's location in
relation to markets. These factors determine the degree of drudgery. It relies secondly
on family size, composition, and the urgency of family demands. These determine
consumption evaluation.
The farm family has to make use of its market situation and natural conditions in

away that enables it to provide an internal equilibrium for family labour and the highest
possible standard of family well-being. This is only achieved by including in the farm's
organizational plan the labour investments, be they specific crops, livestock, machinery,
craft-work, etc., that promise the hi&hest possible labour payment per labour unit
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(Chayanov 1986:7).

Therefore, acceptance of a certain course of economic action

by the farm family is not determined by the calculation of the highest net profit. Rather,
economic behaviour is determined by the need to meet the subjective evaluations of both
demand satisfaction and drudgery of labour. Usually the objects that yield the highest
labour payment per unit are roughly the same as those that guarantee the highest net
profit to capitalists as well. However, the "structural peculiarities" of the family labour
farm are such as to make it undertake very different conduct from capitalist units under
somewhat similar circumstances (Chayanov 1986:7).
Take for instance the case of economic rent. For a capitalist farmer an increase
in the quality of the land farmed or a better location of that land results in "rent", an
objective economic category one can calculate by subtracting material costs of
production, wages, and the interest on capital from gross income. "Rent" then becomes
profit for the capitalist farmer. However, according to Chayanov, the concept of
economic rent does not exist for the family farmer. The move to better land or location
does not produce the same response from the family farmer as it does for the capitalist
farmer, i.e., the prosperity of the family farm does not increase so markedly as does the
return to a capitalist farm influenced by the same factors. Why is this?
A move to better land and/or location for the farm family will result in an
increase in labour productivity. The labourers on the farm, noticing this increase, will
seek to balance the internal equilibrium of the farm, which in this case will mean less
self-exploitation of labour power since the family's demands can be satisfied with less
expenditure of labour power (Chayanov 1986:8). So, the family farm labourers simply
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stop working as hard as they did previously because they can get the same product with
less effort in their improved situation.
Family farmers, according to Chayanov, also behave differently from capitalist
farmers when it comes to buying and selling land. This again is related to the family
farm's attempt to reach internal equilibrium and maximize net income. Tenancy or land
acquisitions are only advantageous to family farmers if, through them, the farm family
can reach internal equilibrium with either an increased level of living or with decreased
expenditure of labour power.
Peasants will not buy or rent more land if they already have enough to employ
all of their family labourers at the optimum degree of intensity of cultivation. Chayanov
postulates that family farmers will only buy or lease land only if acquiring it will allow
them to use unemployed family labour power (1986:9). Using labour power previously
lost in forced inactivity allows them to bring the farm's "intensity nearer the optimum"
(i.e., closer to internal equilibrium between drudgery and demand).
The end result of a land purchase or lease should be an increase in payment per
labour unit and a rise in prosperity important enough "to enable the family unit to pay
for the lease or to purchase a large part of the gross product obtained from the newly
acquired plot" (Chayanov 1986:9). This produces the seeming paradox that the less land
the peasant family owns, i.e., the poorer it is, the more it will be willing to pay for land.
When the peasant farm does not have enough land to employ all of its labour the
only way, aside from engaging in wage labour, to counteract this "unemployment" is to
somehow get more land, thereby raising productivity per labour unit and through this the
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well-being of the family. Therefore, the higher the rural population density the greater
the land prices since peasants with little land in these situations will pay prices well
beyond that of the capitalized rent - beyond the price a capitalist farm will be willing to
pay for it.
Similarly, family farmers will not indulge in other capital expenditures such as
machinery unless it allows for the possibility of a higher level of family well-being. If
a new capital expenditure promises increased prosperity through increasing labour
productivity without unbalancing the farm's internal equilibrium the family labour farm
can pay an unusually high rate of interest for the capital required to purchase the entity.
However, the rate of interest cannot be so high as to completely negate the advantages
of the new investment (Chayanov 1986: 10).
In the family farm this "circulation of capital" does not produce an income from
capital as it would on the capitalist farm. Instead it affects the net labour product of the
farm and through this the critical moment of internal economic equilibrium between
drudgery and demand satisfaction. In addition, if the family does not borrow money for
capital expenditure then the decision on whether or not to invest will depend not only on
the advantage the expenditure will provide but on whether the family can spare the
amount for the investment from its labour income.
Because the money for the purchase comes out of the labour income it will mean
a drop in the family's immediate consumption. Therefore, the decision to purchase will
be made only if what the family has to give up in consumption appears, in the eyes of
the family, to be less than its value for production (Chayanov 1986:11). The larger the
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income of the family the easier it will be for them to find the resources for capital
investment, but in hard times with smaller net incomes, the farm family will find it
difficult to take money intended for consumption to use for new capital investment or
even to replace circulating capital.
These peculiar characteristics of the family farm can lead to a different evolution
than predicted by mainline economists or traditional Marxists. Family farmer's motives
are very different from capitalist farmers - the goal of family farmers is maximizing net
income via internal economic equilibrium rather than simply making a profit. Evidence
from Chayanov and from contemporary developing societies shows that because family
farmers operate on this "maximization of net income" rationale they will sometimes have
the capacity to out-compete capitalist farms based on wage labour, to buy out large landholders, and to offer goods at the cheapest price (Durrenberger 1984; Newby 1978).
Mainline Marxists have argued that family farmers can only out-compete capitalist
farms by intense self-exploitation , i.e., "excruciating labour by underfed peasant families
which damages their physical and mental well-being" (Shanin 1986:6) and in the long run
will eventually lose out to capitalists. Chayanov, however, pointed out that there was
more to peasant farming than this. He showed that for different agricultural regions and
sub-branches of farming at any given stage of technology there are different optimum
sizes.
"For any farming system, taking account of local conditions, we may, by
a series of organizational calculations,determine both the technically most
expedient relationshipof its production factors and the absolute size of the
farmitself to give the lowest cost for produce and consequent!y, the highest
income" (Chayanov 1986:90).
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A decrease as well as an increase from the optimum will make productivity
decline. "Any excess of production means available to labour, or of land above the
technically optimal level, will be an excessive burden on the undertaking" (Chayanov
1986:92). These extra means of production will not lead to an increased volume of
activity since further intensity .of labour beyond the level established for its selfexploitation is unacceptable to the family.
In addition to this family farmers operated in a social context of family's,
kinsmen's, and neighbour's aid and unwaged labour. Therefore, family labour units
were not simply an instance of the weak surviving through super-exploitation of their
labour power but also reflected the utilization of some characteristics of farming and
rural social life that occasionally give the edge to the family-labour farm over the
capitalist farm. This, in tum, means that under capitalism the relative well-being of
family farmers is still a possibility even though there may be self-exploitation and
exploitation (Shanin 1986:6).
Chayanov pointed out the means of resistance that family farmers could and did
use to counter exploitation, something Lenin seemed to ignore. As such his analysis
parallels sociological research that examines the resources available to the working class
in their resistance to capitalists. Family farmers, like urban workers, have not been
completely passive victims of capitalists. They draw on particular economic and social
resources to preserve their family's well-being.

They have also organized on an

occupational basis to further their economic demands and to better their economic and
social conditions. In North America, farmers' social and political movements have often
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achieved more political success than labour movements have (Lipset 1950; Russell 1975;
Saloutus and Hicks 1951).
As well, Chayanov's analysis assumes the simultaneous existence of very different
forms of economic systems. He argued that this empirical "pluralism" should be matched
by conceptual pluralism. In other words, because a number of economic systems could
exist side by side one needed a number of explanatory models for each (Chayanov
1986:27-28). He applied this to family farming, noting that family farms co-exist with
other economic "systems". Although the dominant capitalist system influenced family
farming, this did not cause its "peculiarities" to vanish.

Implications of Each Approach for the Future of Family Farmers

Agricultural economists are not sounding alarm bells over the high rates of
foreclosure or over the persistent decline in the number of family farms over the last two
decades. Instead they argue that the farm economy is actually recovering and that recent
foreclosures have merely wiped out inefficient producers. Getting rid of these inefficient
farmers, they argue, should mean even lower food prices because only the most
productive farmers survive.
Marxists, however, point to foreclosures and the decline trend as evidence of the
eventual destruction of family farming. They view them as the logical outcome of larger
processes of capital concentration and integration. As capitalism grows ever nearer its
highest stage of development it will inevitably squeeze out family farmers, absorbing
them into either the proletariat or the agrarian bourgeoisie.
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However, the third perspective interprets foreclosures and decline somewhat
differently. Extending this argument to predict the future of family farms in capitalist
economies produces a scenario similar to that of the core/periphery industry theory in
which family farms form an integral part of .the capitalist system and constitute a
production segment similar to that of secondary industry.
Proponents of this third perspective point out that farmers, like smaller
manufacturers in the industrial sector, produce high risk but necessary commodities.
Larger firms like to concentrate their production by either directly controlling all the
components needed for their end product. However, they also wish to minimize risk.
Therefore if a particular production component involves a high risk of production failure
larger firms may find it more profitable to contract out or to buy these items from
independent firms. This allows larger corporate firms to avoid responsibility for potential
production failure.
Extending this paradigm to agriculture, agribusiness firms depend on farm
commodities such as plant crops and livestock. However, agricultural production, in most
instances, involves substantial risk since it is subject to uncontrollable environmental and
biological influences. Hence agribusiness capitalists prefer to leave the production of
most foodstuffs to small producers. Capitalists will only enter the direct production of
foodstuffs if such production provides at least the average rate of profit and is not high
risk.
These "dependency" theorists predict that small farmers will survive because of
the riskiness and low returns of agricultural production. However, they do not presume
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either the economic or social vitality of the family farm. Rather they contend that
capitalist penetration into agriculture will transform the class situation of family farmers
(Mooney 1985; Pfeffer 1985a; Pfeffer 1985b). They argue that small farmers will fall
into a contradictory class location between independent producers and the working class.
This change in class location will produce a corresponding decline in family farmers'
social and economic well-being. Family farmers will lose control over the labour process
and their work will become increasingly subject to the direction of agribusiness and
financial capitalists.
The next chapter reviews the existing sociological research on the organization
of farming in the United States. I examine the literature from each of the three
perspectives identified in this chapter and present the conclusions and predictions of the
authors of each persuasion.

SURVEYING THE FIELD: A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATORE

In the previous chapter I outlined the three prevailing paradigms used to explain
the evolution of American agriculture. In this chapter I review the sociological research
literature in each theoretical area. I begin with an examination of the sociological work
that follows a neo-classical economic line of reasoning, follow with the Marxist
literature, and end with an examination of the dependency research findings.

"Farming is a Business": Mechanized Mega-farms as Farms of the Future

Rural sociologists who subscribe to the view that farming is a business like any
other have focused their research on those farms that are indeed businesses and operate
via strict business accounting methods of profit and loss. Hiram Drache's (1976) work
offers the only in-depth research on capitalist farmers and their development in the U.S.
hence this section reviews only his work.
Drache, through historical research on early corporate farms in the mid-west and
personal interviews with present-day mid-western corporate farmers in Montana, North
Dakota, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Iowa, gives us a picture of what he believes the
future of farming in America will, and should, be. Drache sees decreases in the number
of farmers as a positive rather than negative achievement in American agriculture
(1976:430). The trend toward smaller numbers of farmers producing ever more
commodities signifies a highly efficient agricultural system. He equates efficiency with
man hours per unit of production, as do the farmers he interviews. The goal of
agriculture, according to these corporate farmers, is to produce food ever more cheaply
37
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and the only way to do this is through organizing farms along strict business lines. These
"progressive" farmers "look at farming as a good business ... that, if properly managed,
can be just as profitable as any other business. Modern farming, like any other business,
is a matter of mechanization, money, and management" (Drache 1976:430).
Agricultural efficiency, argues Drache, has come about through technological
innovations in the areas of mechanization, seed hybridization, improved stock breeding
and feeding practices, the use of "additives" to crops such as pesticides, herbicides, and
commercial fertilizers, and the vertical integration of large farming operations. Drache
argues the farmers who have been responsible for these innovations are corporate farmers
and they have large and successful because of their hard work, perservance, and
willingness to adopt new methods of production.
What Drache documents, but fails to emphasize, is the advantages these corporate
farmers started with that enabled their hard work and perserverance to reap greater
payoffs than less advantaged, but equally hard-working and dedicated farmers. In every
case each of these farmers started out with more land, in some cases, vastly more land,
than ordinary homesteaders. In every case except one this land was much better than
average and generally located in river valleys. In addition, their families had, from the
homesteading days, relied on more than just farming for income. All had business
interests and their family histories describe business involvement in such enterprises as
machinery dealerships, agricultural supply dealerships, banks, local stores, elevator
companies, power plants, and, in one case, a machinery manufacturing plant (c.f.,
Drache, Chapters V, VI, and VII). In some cases farming served as the secondary
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industry rather than the primary one with the family business subsidizing the family
farm.
Their business interests enabled these farmers to purchase more land, afford the
latest in technology, and generally improve the quality of their farming operations. They
also gave these farmers an edge in selling their produce. Because they did not have to
rely solely on income from their farm commodities they could hold their produce until
market highs and get a greater return on their grain and livestock (Drache 1976:
183,188). Others got higher returns by direct marketing through their own elevators or
livestock feedlots and shipping companies (Drache 1976: 176, 232-235).
Drache ignores the edge these farmers had on others and proceeds to argue the
farming methods used by these large farmers are the way of the future since it is by these
methods alone that they have become successful. He also ignores the environmental
consequences of large farms. He feels the use of large four-wheel drive machinery for
grain farming, the use of herbicides and pesticides, the movement towards few hybrid
varieties of cash-grains, and the production of livestock in confined environments
produce only good in that they result in increased production and thereby lower prices
(Drache 1976: 260-261,448). Each of these practices, however, has severe environmental
costs.
Mechanization saves farmers labour but it also causes soil degradation and weed
infestation. It has probably caused the greatest problems in the great plains region. Fourwheel drive tractors used on large acreages both erode and compact the soil. The
introduction of combines for small-grain farming, while greatly reducing labour time
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needed for harvest, have also greatly increased the spread of weeds. Combining scatters
weed seeds throughout the entire field during harvest (Ian Miller, personal
communication, October 1989). The weed infestation problem has become so severe in
some areas that farmers have resorted to the herbicide Glean, which essentially sterilizes
the soil, preventing not only weed growth but greatly reducing the quality of the soil (Ian
Miller, Wallace Miller, Dave Pearson; personal communication, May 1990). Threshing
machines may have required more labour than combines but they had the advantage of
controlling weeds since grain, and consequently weeds, were threshed in only a few spots
in the field. Mechanization has also become a more expensive proposition over the years
as fuel prices and machinery and parts prices spiral ever upwards.
Raising beef, hogs, and poultry in confined spaces such as beef feedlots, hog
farrowing crates and "growing" barns, chicken cages, and turkey pens increases the
incidence of disease and parasitic pests (Drache 1976:402). Farmers who raise livestock
in this manner have increasingly relied on regular administration of antibiotics with daily
feeding to control disease whether or not animals are diseased (Schell 1983: 62-65). They
resort to heavy applications of pesticide to control insect problems like flies in feedlots
and lice in chicken barns (Schell 1983: 155-162). The overuse of antibiotics in livestock
production and the consequences of it have been well documented by Schell (1983).
As the indiscriminate prescription of penicillin to prostitutes in Vietnam produced
an antibiotic resistant strain of gonorrhoea, Neisseria gono"heae, so has the overuse of
penicillin and tetracycline in American livestock production produced resistant strains of
dysentery, streptococci, and staphylococci bacteria (Schell 1983: 24,36). The frightening
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thing about these bacteria is their ability to transfer themselves to human hosts (Schell
1983: 24,32,41,118-119). The transfer has greatly alarmed biologists and medical
researchers. Many feel we may be forced back into a pre-antibiotic era unless we put a
stop to the overuse of antibiotics in both humans and animals (Schell 1983: 27,41,121).
The story of pesticides and herbicides parallels that of antibiotic resistant bacteria.
These came into widespread use after World War II and their destructive potential was
first pointed out in the 1960's by Rachel Carson in her book Silent Spring. As with
antiobiotics and bacteria, herbicides and pesticides eventually produce resistant strains
of weeds and insects while at the same time destroying their natural enemies. Eventually
we reach the point where the herbicide or pesticide no longer is effective and the plant
or insect has too few natural enemies left. Infestations result and, as noted above, some
farmers have resorted to completely destroying soil fertility simply to wipe out herbicideresistant weeds.
So Drache may laud his corporate farmers for their greatly increased production
and consequent lowering of commodities prices but their methods are ecologically
unsound. Highly specialized, large-scale farming techniques, as practiced by corporate
farmers and those family farmers able to afford such methods, may well contain the
"seeds of their own destruction". I tum now to the Marxist literature on the development
of agriculture in capitalist economies.
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Family Farmers as the Petit Boureeoisie: Losine Out to Capitalist Aericulture
The major thesis of Marxists is that family farmers' present situation stems in
large part from the growth of monopoly capitalism. Marxists argue that agribusiness
incursions into the agricultural sector have promoted a polarization process in U.S.
agriculture creating a current situation in which most of our remaining farmers comprise
either large-scale, highly mechanized operators or small, marginalized agriculturalists
relying heavily on off-farm income for their livelihood.
Traditional Marxists posit that corporate capitalist agribusiness will eventually
destroy family farms. Independent farmers continue to exist in advanced capitalist
societies, they argue, only because of capitalist inattention and risky investment
problems. Farming constitutes the "last frontier" for capitalists and they have not yet
turned their attention to solving the problem of high risk and slow return on investment
in the production of certain agricultural commodities. But when they do agribusiness
firms will move in and destroy small producers.
Marxists have concentrated on documenting declining numbers of family farms,
the growing numbers of corporate farms, and the monopoly corporate farmers have over
specific foodstuffs. They also devote research to the study of the rural proletariat agricultural labourers. Goss et al. (1980) analysis of U.S. agricultural census data from
1920 to 1978 shows declining numbers of family farmers for the U.S. as a whole from.
They also identify a trend towards greater numbers of days spent on off-farm work on
the part of family farmers and greater reliance on off-farm income. Their examination
of the data on numbers of corporate farms reveals an increase in the percentage of

43

corporate farms and in the amount of farmland these farms control. On the basis of these
statistics they conlcude that family farmers in the U.S. are in the process of
proletarianization. They predict the eventual demise of family farmers and the take-over
of the agricultural sector by corporate farmers. Havens (1985) points to the expanding
number of farm commodities that are now dominated by corporate farms or agribusiness
firms who have moved into actual food production.
Capitalist movement into the actual production of agricultural commodities
through farms owned by an individual or groups of individuals solely for the purpose of
making a profit and employing wage rather than family labour to do the farm work
represents one way in which capitalism undermines family farming. When looking at
capitalist domination of certain commodities, however, one must keep in mind that
capitalist farms are not recent developments in the U.S. Much of southern and
southwestern American agriculture followed and still follows this type of arrangement
(Howe 1982; Vogeler 1978). In addition, most of corporate farms are family-owned
corporations although it is true that large corporations such as Tenneco and Campbell's
have moved into actual food production.
The increasing numbers of corporate farms are generally interpreted as the big
winning out over the small, e.g., large farmers push small farmers out of production in
certain areas producers. Marxists view this as merely another step, and a predictable one,
in the proletarianization of family farmers.

While individual family farms, whether

large or small, still predominate in grain farming, mixed farming, dairying, and hog and
cattle production, corporations have gained significant control over the actual food
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farmers depending upon the type of foodstuffs they are producing, e.g., northern plains
wheat farmers as opposed to corn-soybean-livestock farmers of the midwest;
identification of the factors that promote the growth of some family farmers; and the
possibility of a non-linear developmental model for agriculture in capitalist economies.
The following discussion presents research on family farmers from a perspective that
draws heavily on the Chayanovian tradition - dependency theory.

Family Farmers and Independent Commodity Production

Family labour farms diverge from capitalist enterprises because they rely almost
exclusively on family labour instead of wage labour and because the household is both
a production and a consumption unit. Although most economists class them as small
capitalists, family farmers don't operate on the same principles as capitalists.

The

overriding goal of capitalists is to reap the average rate of profit from their business. If
an operation fails to achieve or maintain this rate capitalists abandon it.
As Chayanov pointed out family farmer's motives differ in that farmers strive to
maximize their net income by getting the most out of the bundle of resources they
control. To stay "in business" family farmers do not have to realize a specific rate of
profit. Rather they can continue to operate as long as they make enough income to
accommodate their subsistence needs and the maintenance needs of the farm. Unlike
capitalists, family farmers will settle for a lower rate of profit and sometimes no profit
at all.
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This ability gives them a distinct advantage over capitalist farmers in certain types
of agricultural production. For example, grain farming in the midwest and western states
involves low return on investments. In the late 19th century wheat-producing family
farmers outlasted capitalist "bonanza" wheat farmers apparently because they could
survive on lower rates of return than their profit-oriented counterparts and could more
fully utilized the labour power of their families than bonanza farmers could utilize the
labour of their hired hands (Drache 1976: 183).
In 1987 individual or family farms still dominated U.S. agriculture and constituted
86.6 percent of all farms (U.S. Census of Agriculture 1987). In addition, the percentage
of family farms in the U.S. remained steady from 1920 to 1987. In spite of predictions
to the contrary family farm organization has survived as a form of agricultural production
under advanced capitalism.
Of the remaining thirteen percent of all farms partnerships accounted for just over
nine percent of farms; corporations comprised slightly over three percent of total farm
ownership; and co-operatives, estates, or trusts made up six-tenths of one percent of all
farms. The vast majority of these corporate farms (85.0%) consisted of smaller family
corporations with 10 or fewer shareholders, while family corporations with more than
ten shareholders accounted for 3.0 percent of all corporate farms. Non-family
corporations with less than 10 shareholders made up 10.0 percent of all corporate farms
and non-family corporations with 10 or more shareholders comprised the remaining 1.9
percent of corporate farm owners (Table 1). Three-fifths (59.2%) of all farmers owned
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all their land while thirty percent (29.3%) were part-owners and twelve percent (11.6%)
were tenants.
While family farmers make up the majority of producers this does not mean
everything is well on the family farm. We still have more family farmers than other
types of farmers but there are far fewer of them than in the past. Dependency theorists
have been most interested in those family farmers who continue to survive in spite of low
commodities prices and increasing operating expenses.
Dependency theorists want to know what it is about family farming in capitalist
economies that has enabled these operators to endure such prohibitive conditions. Their
interest has been two-fold: they have looked at both family farmers' survival tactics and
at what they see as the inherent weaknesses in capitalist business organization that
prevent capitalists from moving directly into agricultural production.
These theorists do not romanticize the survival of the family farm. Rather they
view it as filling the interstices of a capitalist agribusiness sector somewhat the same way
in which secondary industries fill the production gaps for large corporations in the
industrial sector. Like small manufacturers, family farmers produce high risk
commodities for oligopolistic buyers, e.g., agribusiness firms like Cargill, Dreyfuss, or
Green Giant, and are subject to the same marginal and controlled existence this
engenders in the industrial sphere, e.g., auto parts suppliers for General Motors, Ford,
and Chrysler. They feel family farms continue because they provide an advantage to
agribusiness just as secondary manufacturers provide an advantage to industrial capitalists
- by taking all the risk and receiving only marginal returns.
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Researchers utilizing dependency perspectives have argued family farms will
continue to exist but in a more exploited position than in the past. The exploitation comes
about through the efforts of agribusiness firms and financial institutions to control family
farmers by other means than moving directly into food production. Agribusiness capitalist
and financial capitalists can dominate farmers by taking over some aspects of the
production process from them, such as decisions over what crops to grow, what crop
production methods to use, and who to sell their crops to.

This can happen through

three developments: indebtedness, contract farming, and part-time farming. Each of these
processes result in increasing exploitation of family farmers labour and loss of autonomy
over their farming operations. In opposition to the relatively independent producer of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries late twentieth farmers, according to dependency
theorists, have moved toward the status of "propertied labourers".

Family Farmers as "Propertied Labourers"

The loss of control by family farmers' over certain parts of the agricultural
production process - has provoked two explanations. Traditional Marxists see
indebtedness, contract farming, and part-time farming as simply steps in the movement
towards eventual proletarianization. However, dependency theorists see these processes
as turning family farmers into a class of individuals who own the means of production,
e.g., land, but who do not completely control the use to which these means are put.
The dependency approach to family farming explains the continued existence of
family labour farms because of their advantage to capitalist development. These theorists
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view family farming not as "evidence of a lack of capitalist development but as an
integral part of the capitalist system within which it has been shaped and maintained
through decades of dependence and exploitation" (Davis 1980: 134).
In the decades since the mid-19th century the family farm has become
increasingly integrated into a system of exploitative capitalist relations. Dependency
theorists argue that this integration has led not only to the maintenance of the family farm
but its domination by agribusiness and finance capitalists (Davis 1980: 135). They argue
that this capitalist domination transforms the majority of family farmers into "propertied
labourers - a contradictory class location between the petty bourgeoisie and wagelabourers (Mooney 1985). They contend that family farmers will continue to occupy such
a class position because they provide monopoly capital with particular advantages not
obtained elsewhere.
At the theoretical level the argument takes its departure from Marx's view that
possession of the means of production guarantees no absolute protection against
exploitation. Indeed, even the propertied may have their surplus value expropriated.
Although Marx saw individual private property as a barrier against the capitalist mode
of production because the labourer can accumulate for himself, this is only the case if
possessing the means of production assures autonomous production (Davis 1980: 138).
The presence of smaller, "independent" producers, who still own their means of
production, does not automatically indicate a lack of capitalist encroachment into that
sector of the economy.
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Instead, increasing indebtedness, contract farming, and part-time farming (off-farm
work) have promoted a loss of production autonomy and the expropriation of surplus
value from farmers. As a result of these processes the farmer has moved from being part
of the petty bourgeoisie to occupying a more mixed, or contradictory, class location. The
farmer is transformed into a "propertied labourer" who is not completely proletarianized
since he still owns part of his means of production and has some, although not complete,
control over the labour process (Mooney 1985:8). It is to these three processes that I now
turn, looking initially at the literature dealing with indebtedness, then at contract farming,
and finally at part-time farming.

Loss of Control Through Indebtedness

The nature of agricultural credit systems exacerbates the increasing capitalist
penetration into agriculture and the "cost-price" squeeze on family farmers. In order to
keep up with new techniques and increase production farmers have had to borrow money
from financial institutions. Costs of machinery, chemicals, fuel and land require
investments and high expenditures. Large amounts of money have to be advanced just
to begin each crop year. In 1975, for instance, each acre brought under cultivation
required an initial output of $82 (Havens 1985:27) but farmers had to wait at least six
months for a return on this investment.
As farm costs increase and commodity prices decrease, many farmers find that they
can barely maintain interest payments on debts let alone pay off the principal.
Indebtedness creates the conditions under which farmers lose control over actual farm
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production because farmers enter production contracts to overcome their debt payments
and because banks pressure them into particular production strategies (or processes)
(Mitchell 1972:21; Mooney 1982:8).
Increased indebtedness of full-owner operators occasioned by sky-rocketing input
costs means that most farmers have become enormously dependent on credit institutions
for continued operation. Mooney (1985:9) argues that the interest on a loan secured by
the land approximates a rent and puts farmers in the position of tenants even though they
formally hold title to the land. Interest payments, like rent, constitute an appropriation
of surplus value from direct producers and fulfill one criterion of the proletarianization
process.
In addition, control of capital by the creditor also erodes the direct producer's power
over the labour process. The more dependent a producer becomes on the creditor the
more the creditor can control the producer's labour process. However, producers vary
in whether they have access to alternative sources of credit and in their credit "standing"
(Green 1984:570). Hence, some producers depend more on financial credit systems than
others.
Mooney's (1985) interviews with Wisconsin farmers indicated that banks
increasingly direct how some of the indebted farmers' produce (e.g., what to plant,
methods of production, etc.). Creditors threaten with foreclosure farmers who do not
follow creditors' instructions. Thus, creditors can gain the power to structure both the
producer's means of production and the labour process. "The appearance of being one's
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own boss is reproduced while the basis of that autonomy is undermined" (Mooney

1982:10).
Therefore, through indebtedness creditors can extract the farmer's surplus value
via interest payments and control the farmer's labour process via directing production.
Each process moves the family farmer toward proletarianization. This transformation,
however, remains incomplete without foreclosure. Since some credit institutions choose
to "manage" farmers' production rather than to foreclose, these producers fall into a
contradictory class location between the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat (Mooney

1985: 10).
If banks used foreclosure more extensively, farmers would become completely

proletarianized and confirm the theses of traditional Marxists. However, creditors refrain
from foreclosures because they obtain a greater economic advantage when they
perpetually extract interest from indebted family farmers. If the creditors acquired the
land through foreclosure they would then have to sell it or hire managers for it. Instead
the creditors reap the benefit of the family farmer's "willingness" and ability to work
even harder and generate enough surplus value to pay the interest on his debts. In other
words, creditors profit when they maintain the indebted relationship. They favour the
certain gains they obtain from interest payments and direct control of the production
process over the uncertain gains from foreclosures and sale of the ·property (Mooney

1985: 11).
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However, indebtedness is only one way in which farmers move into the
contradictory class location of propertied labourers. Family farmers can also lose control
over their labour process through contract farming.

Loss of Control Through Contract Fanning
Contract farming has become increasingly common in vegetable production (Mooney
1985; Pfeffer 1985a). Davis (1980:142) equates it with industrial piece work wage
agreements. Under contract farming farmers produce agricultural commodities at an
agreed upon unit price. The farmer contributes his labour power and tools of production
(land, machinery, etc.), while the agribusiness firm provides the inputs such as seed,
fertilizer, feed, etc. Under contract farming agribusiness expropriates the surplus value
and the farmer loses primary control over production decisions, the labour process, and
some of the means of production (e.g., inputs). Therefore, contract farming also
promotes the transformation of the independent farmer into a propertied labourer.
Although the farmer participates in many production decisions and holds full title
to the contracted product, the agribusiness firm maintains direct control over how
production will proceed. The agribusiness firm insists on a tight production schedule
because this facilitates processing, extends the production season, and increases the
number of production cycles. In addition agribusiness encourages farmers to mechanize
extensively to maximize product output per man hour and to use highly "innovative" new
hybrids, chemicals, and techniques. These practices supposedly allow farmers to
"improve" quality, increase yields, and use their equipment, facilities and land more
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effectively (Davis 1980: 143; Mooney 1985: 11). However, they also reduce unit costs and
the agribusiness capitalist profits when the contract farmer realizes his production
potential as fully as possible.
Since agribusiness firms pay farmers according to "quality" of product and time of
delivery farmers will work harder and longer with no increase in pay to improve
productivity. This not only reduces the unit cost of production but increases product
quality and yields for the same amount of labour time.
In addition, contract farming has similar advantages for agribusiness firms that
sub-contracting has for monopoly industrial firms. As in the industrial sector,
agribusiness firms limit their production to low risk commodities (Pfeffer 1985a: 1).
Where producers cannot control market uncertainties through increases in size large firms
prefer to sub-contract for inputs. In these cases monopoly capital can operate more
efficiently without entering into direct production.
In fact, direct production of agricultural commodities involves a number of "risks"
(Mann and Dickinson 1980). For instance, poor environmental conditions, insect plagues,
disease, and natural disasters can completely wipe out crops. This leaves the direct
producer with nothing to show for his investment of time and money. Agribusiness firms
protect themselves from such uncertainties when they let the farmer bear the costs of
failed production.
Direct production of agricultural commodities also demands high levels of initial
investments and a delay of at least six months for a return on capital. Costs of land,
machinery, fuel, seed, and chemicals are extremely high. The agribusiness firm that
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engages in contracting can minimize these high input costs. It only supplies some of the
inputs (typically seed and chemicals) while it relies on the farmer to provide the most
expensive inputs (fuel, land, machinery) (Pfeffer 1985a). Furthermore, the firm can delay
paying the farmer for his labour time until he delivers the product.
However, contract farming represents one way for the farmer to cut his costs (the
cost of pesticides and seed for instance) and thereby increase his income. Another method
family farmers are relying on to supplement farm income is wage labour. This turns
them into "part-time" farmers.

Loss of Control through Part-time Fanning

Increasing numbers of farmers engage in off-farm wage-work and farm only parttime. These part-time farmers may occupy two class locations: propertied farmer and
wage-labourer. While farmers may avoid debt, tenancy, or contract farming through
wage-work they remain "independent" in their farm work only at the price of selling
their labour-power elsewhere (Mooney 1985: 14). Off-farm work, therefore, also moves
the farmer into the contradictory class location between the petty bourgeoisie and the
proletariat.
Empirical research on the wage wrok part-time farmers engage in is sparse. From
Mooney's work in Wisconsin we know that some part-time farmers engage in agricultural
wage-work when they work off their own farm. They work as hired hands for larger
neighbouring farmers, helping out during the busiest times of the season (Mooney 1985).
Like indebtedness and contract-farming the presence of a number of part.:time farmers
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potentially benefits capitalists. In this case the benefits accrue to those capitalists directly
involved in agricultural production -large farmers relying on wage labour (Pfeffer
1985b).
As Pfeffer (1985b:18-19) points out, part-time farmers form a likely labour pool
with assets that capitalist farmers would not find elsewhere. Because part-time farmers
generally live in the same area as the larger farmers that they work for they are readily
available for work. Furthermore, they have other means of subsistence besides
agricultural wage labour so they accept the seasonality of agricultural work. As a result,
the employer does not have to compensate these workers for periods of "lay-off''. Parttime farmers are also skilled workers. Their knowledge of production techniques and
machinery operation matches that of their employer's. Employers don't have to train
them and can trust them to do the job properly.
Based on the preceding descriptions of indebtedness, contract farming, and part-

time farming dependency theorists predict the continued existence of family farmers for
three reasons: companies and banks can avoid the risks of agricultural production by both
indebtedness and contract farming and capitalist farmers are assured of a skilled and
readily available labour force by part-time farming. Family farmers will survive but in
a much altered form from the archetypal independent farmer relying completely on farm
income for his livelihood and employing family labour to run the farm.
Related to the non-linear development notion is the possibility that the
development of agriculture may not be uniform across a nation. Certain types of
agricultural production may lend themselves better to a family farm type of organization
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than to a capitalist type of organization. Newby (1978) and Buttell (1980) point to
dairying and cereal production as types of production favouring family farm organization
rather than capitalist organization.
The fate of family farmers in situations of debt, contract-farming, and part-time
farming remains uncertain. The creditor/debtor relationship seems the most precarious
one for family farmers since bank foreclosures account for most of the recent family
farm liquidations. Contract farming and engaging in off-farm work can become survival
strategies for family farmers. These practices allow farmers to stay on the farm, avoid
increasing indebtedness, and reduce some of the risks involved in production. So instead
of viewing these developments as completely inimical to family farmers researchers
should also realize they provide resources for family farmers.
Although trends over the past 67 years indicate decreasing numbers of family
farmers in the U.S., the proportion of family farmers has not changed much. What has
changed is the size of farms and the way in which farm work is done. Looking at the
U.S. as a whole farms have expanded in size by over 300 acres and farmers increasingly
rely on machines to aid them in their work. However, looking at national data obscures
regional differences among farmers. Farm size, tenure of farm operators, farm
organization, and reliance on hired labour vary from region to region, depending on what
farmers are producing. For instance, farmers in California and the southwestern states
have always relied more heavily on agricultural wage workers than have northern and
midwestern farmers. In addition capitalist farms are not recent developments in the west
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and southwest. Capitalist farming in these areas dates back to the mid-nineteenth century
(c.f., Vogeler 1978).
Before coming to the conclusion that family farmers are on the road to extinction
we should instead try to discover why the greatest proportion of farms in the U.S. still
remain family farms and how these farmers have adapted to changing economic
conditions. To look more closely at family farmers and their strategies I have selected
two states, North Dakota and Illinois, where farming began with family homesteading
and has continued to be primarily organized on the lines of family labour farming.
I chose states where agriculture has been, and still is, characterized by family
labour farms to better illustrate changes in farm organization over the past 67 years. If
one makes the assertion that capitalist farms are coming to dominate agricultural
production, as traditional Marxists fear and agricultural economists laud, one must
demonstrate that this type of farm has indeed made notable inroads into areas where
family labour farms had once been the hallmark of agricultural production. It is not
enough to show that there are a significant number of corporate farms in California to
clinch the argument of corporate farm success since California has not had a history of
family labour farming as the primary mode of production in agriculture (Rasmussen
1974; Vogeler 1978). One has to show that proportions of corporate farms have grown
significantly in areas where family labour farms once dominated.
An additional reason for using North Dakota and Illinois is that farmers in each
area produce different types of commodities. Choosing to explore different types of
production allows comparisons of farming strategies and provides a way in which to
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evaluate the effect of the commodity produced on the ability of family farmers to survive
under capitalist economic conditions. In North Dakota farmers predominantly grow wheat
for a living and if they engage in livestock production they raise cattle. Illinois farmers
produce corn and soybeans as their cash grains while hogs form the largest proportion
of livestock raised in the state. By comparing these two type of production we should be
able to see if one is more conducive to family labour farming than the other and then
speculate on reasons as to why or why not.

WHO GROWS WHAT, AND HOW?: INTERPRETING TIIE NUMBERS

In order to evaluate the competing explanations for the path American agriculture
has followed I examine data on farm numbers, farm size, farm ownership patterns, offfarm work, farm organization, farm labour needs, and farm production patterns over
time. I begin with a description of the changes that have taken place in the numbers and
size of American farms. I then present farm ownership patterns to try and come to some
conclusion about how securely family farmers hold their land. Off-farm work data is
examined to provide an idea of how able farmers are to maintain an adequate income on
the basis of farming alone. Finally, since a key piece of each competing explanation
involves the organization of farming in the U.S. I look specifically at how many farms
are organized on an individual or family level, on a partnership level, and on a corporate
level. This organizational analysis is followed by a closer look at farms within these
categories in terms of their labour needs and the types of commodities they produce.

A Trend of Declining Numbers and Increasing Size

In terms of an overall picture of the number of farms in Illinois and North Dakota
both states exhibited a marked decline in actual farm numbers over the 1920 to 1987
period. While the decreases were severe in each state Illinois lost more farms and more
land in farms than North Dakota (Table 1). In 1987 Illinois had only 37 percent of the
farms it had in 1920. Moreover total land area in farms had fallen to 80 percent of the
1920 land area. By 1987 North Dakota had 45 percent of the number of farms it had in
1920 while the land in farms stood at 90 percent of the land in farms in 1920.
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In Illinois declines in farm numbers occurred in every period between each
agricultural census except for the 1930 to 1935 period (Table 1). The same picture
appeared in North Dakota with the only difference being two periods of farm number
increase, the 1925 to 1930 period, and the 1930 to 1935 period. From 1920 to 1935 total
land in farms remained the same in both states. Between 1940 and 1987 total land in
farms exhibited an overall decrease with slight ups and downs during this interval.
Interestingly enough the rate of farm number decrease was higher in Illinois
between 1950 and 1964 and higher in North Dakota between 1954 and 1964 than it was
between 1974 and 1987 (Table 1), the period that is now being touted as the "farm
crisis". While not denying the alarming rate of recent farm number declines these
statistics may point to changes in perception of the agricultural sector among the general
public and to changes in the nature of farm number decline. Perhaps in the 1950's and
1960's the reasons for number decreases stemmed more from retirement of older farmers
who had no descendants willing to carry on the farming operation, for economic reasons
or reasons of personal preference, whereas the crisis of the 1970's and 1980's has
stemmed from foreclosures on farmers who still wish to carry on farming. The numbers
decrease in the 1980's rates the label "crisis" because of the resistance, and hence
visibility, it generates not because of the magnitude in the decrease of farm numbers.
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Table 1. Farm Numbers for North Dakota and Illinois: 1920 to 1987
NORm DAKOTA

ILLINOIS

Year

Farms

% Decrease

Farms

% Decrease

1920

77,690

**

237,181

**

1925

75,970

2.2%

225,601

4.9%

1930

77,975

2.6%

214,495

4.9%

1935

84,606

8.5%

231,312

7.8%

1940

73,963

12.6%

213,439

7.7%

1945

69,520

6.0%

204,239

4.3%

1950

65,401

5.9%

195,268

4.4%

1954

61,943

5.3%

175,543

10.1%

1959

54,928

11.3%

154,644

11.9%

1964

48,836

11.1%

132,822

14.1%

1969

46,381

5.0%

123,565

7.0%

1974

42,710

7.9%

111,049

10.1%

1978

40,357

5.5%

104,690

5.7%

1982

36,431

9.7%

98,483

5.9%

1987

35,289

3.1%

88,786

9.8%

While farm numbers decreased in both states farm size increased (Table 2).
Increments in average farm size occurred between every census with only one exception
in Illinois and two in North Dakota. In 1920 Illinois farms averaged 135 acres but by
1987 the average farm was 2.38 times as large with 321 acres the average size. North
Dakota farms averaged 466 acres in 1920 and 1,143 acres in 1987, almost two and onehalf times the size of the average 1920 farm. However, average increases in farm size
do not give a picture of the distribution of acres. For that we need to examine the
numbers of farms within specific size categories.
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Table 2. Average Size of Farms for North Dakota and Illinois: 1920 to 1987
NORm DAKOTA

Year

Average Si7.e

ll..LINOIS
Average Si7.e

1920

466 acres

135 acres

1925

452 acres

136 acres

1930

496 acres

143 acres

1935

462 acres

137 acres

1940

513 acres

145 acres

1945

590 acres

155 acres

1950

630 acres

159 acres

1954

676 acres

173 acres

1959

755 acres

196 acres

1964

875 acres

226 acres

1969

930 acres

242 acres

1974

992 acres

262 acres

1978

1,033 acres

282 acres

1982

1,104 acres

292 acres

1987

1,143 acres

321 acres

In 1920 the agricultural census divided farms in the United States into six size
categories. In 1964 the census added an extra category for farms over 2,000 acres
(Tables 3a, 3b). Looking first at Illinois, the modal category for farm size in Illinois in
1920, based on this six category scheme, was 50 to 179 acres (Table 3a). Fifty-six
percent of all Illinois farms concentrated in this category. By 1987 the modal category
had changed to 180 to 499 acres and exhibited less concentration with 30 percent of all
farms falling into this category.
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Table 3a. Percentage of Farms Falling Into Specified Size Categories for Illinois:
1920 to 1987
Siu in Acres

1,000-

2,000
ormore

Year

1-9

10-49

S0-179 180-499 500-999

1920

3.4%

15.0%

56.2%

24.5%

.7%

.1%

a

1925

3.7%

15.0%

55.1%

25.4%

.8%

.1%

a

1930

4.2%

13.7%

53.2%

27.9%

1.0%

.1%

a

1935

6.1%

15.9%

51.4%

25.6%

1.0%

.1%

a

1940

6.0%

15.0%

49.6%

27.9%

1.3%

.1%

a

1945

6.8%

14.9%

45.1%

31.3%

1.8%

.2%

a

1950

7.2%

14.3%

43.9%

32.4%

2.0%

.2%

a

1954

6.4%

12.5%

41.8%

36.6%

2.6%

.2%

a

1959

4.0%

12.1%

38.2%

44.5%

4.0%

.4%

a

1964

3.3%

10.9%

34.7%

43.7%

6.7%

.6%

.1%

1969

4.1%

10.9%

33.1%

41.6%

9.1%

.1%

.1%

1974

3.8%

12.1%

32.9%

37.6%

11.6%

1.9%

.2%

1978

4.7%

13.6%

29.8%

35.4%

13.4%

2.8%

.3%

1982

6.2%

15.7%

27.9%

32.2%

14.1%

3.7%

.5%

1987

6.7%

14.6%

26.8%

30.1%

16.1%

5.0%

.7%

1,999

Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding.

The largest percentage increase within categories came for farms of 1,000 or
more acres. These farms comprised less than one-tenth of one percent (0.08%) of all
farms in Illinois in 1920. However, by 1987 they made up almost six percent of all
farms, a percentage increase of 7, 112! Farms in the 500 to 999 acre group showed the
next largest increase. In 1987 these farms made up 16 percent of all farms whereas in
1920 they accounted for less than one percent of all farms (0. 78 %) . The 50 to 179 acre
category lost the greatest percentage of farms dropping from over one-half (56.2 %) of
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all farms in 1920 to just over one-quarter (26.8%) of all farms in 1987. While the 180
to 499 acre group became the modal size group in 1987 it exhibited an up and down
pattern over the same period. By 1959 it had increased its share of all farms to 44
percent but then declined to its present thirty percent figure. The percentage of farms in
the 10 to 49 acre category remained fairly stable over the 67 year period comprising 15
percent of all farms in 1920 and just over fourteen percent of all farms in 1987. Very
small farms of one to nine acres also exhibited an up and down pattern but by 1987 made
up about seven percent of all farms compared to their three percent share of 1920.
In North Dakota the 1920 modal category for farms was the 180 to 499 group
which contained over one-half (54.2) of all farms (Table 3b). As with Illinois, farms
concentrated heavily in one category. However, by 1987 this category had experienced
the greatest decline in percentage of farms and now comprised only 17 percent of all
farms. The modal category had changed to 1,000 or more acres, which comprised about
42 percent of all farms, and the distribution of farms became less concentrated than in
1920. Of the 42 percent of farms with 1,000 acres or more of land, 28 percent were in
the 1,000 to 1,999 acres range and 14 percent were in the 2,000 or more acres group.
Therefore, since 1920, North Dakota has experienced a greater trend towards large and
very large farms than has Illinois.
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Table 3b. Percentage of Farms Falling Into Specified Size
Categories for North Dakota: 1920 to 1987
Siu in Acres
Year

1-9

10-49

50-179

180-499

500-999

1,0002,000
1,999 or more

1920

.19%

.9%

16.0%

54.2%

23.7%

5.1%

a

1925

.43%

1.2%

16.2%

53.8%

23.7%

4.7%

a

1930

.49%

1.5%

14.1%

50.0%

27.0%

7.0%

a

1935

1.49%

24.7%

18.2%

48.1%

23.5%

6.2%

a

1940

.91%

2.1%

16.0%

46.1%

26.2%

8.7%

a

1945

1.10%

1.8%

11.0%

43.0%

31.7%

11.5%

a

1950

.91 %

1.7%

9.6%

40.7%

33.8%

13.4%

a

1954

1.20%

1.4%

8.5%

37.4%

35.5%

16.0%

a

1959

.49%

1.6%

7.3%

32.4%

37.6%

20.7%

a

1964

.85%

1.6%

6.3%

27.0%

37.3%

21.8%

5.3%

1969

2.80%

1.6%

7.4%

23.0%

34.0%

24.5%

6.8%

1974

2.30%

1.8%

8.0%

21.5%

31.0%

26.5%

8.9%

1978

2.60%

2.2%

8.8%

19.6%

29.2%

27.6%

10.0%

1982

3.10%

3.1%

8.7%

18.1%

26.8%

27.6%

12.7%

1987

2.50%

4.5%

8.6%

17.4%

24.5%

28.4%

14.2%

Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding.

The trend in both states, then, has been towards fewer farms and larger farms.
This indicates some farmers have found increasing size necessary for continued
operation. They must either get larger or get out. The question then becomes one of
which farms survive to grow larger. To shed some light on that subject I tum to an
examination of the tenure of ownership of farms and all land in farms.
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From Tenant to Full Owner or Full Owner to Tenant: Stairway
to the Petty Bourgeoisie or Slippery Slope to the Proletariat?

The pattern of ownership of farm land provides ambiguous data on how well
farmers are doing. The neo-classical economist model predicts family farmers move from
tenancy, to part-ownership, and then to full ownership. Therefore, their measurement of
how well farmers are doing would include a somewhat even distribution of farms
between full owners, part-owners, and tenants. Classical Marxists, on the other hand, see
tenancy as a precarious situation. They consider high rates of tenancy as evidence of
family farmers tenuous hold on the land that eventually results in total loss of land and
movement into the ranks of the rural proletariat. Marxists would view higher rates of full
ownership as a better situation for family farmers. Part-ownership would indicate a
condition in which family farmers found themselves in need of more land to make ends
meet but unable to afford to buy the land outright.
Dependency theorists view tenancy and part-ownership ambiguously. On the one
hand, if economic times are good, part owners and tenants may have the ability to buy
some of their rented land. Hence rates of tenancy should decrease in years when farmers
harvest good crops. Conversely, an overall poor harvest or poor price for agricultural
commodities puts part owners and tenants in a precarious position, often resulting in the
inability to pay the rent and hence reduction in farm size or total movement off the land.
In both Illinois and North Dakota tenancy rates in any given census year appear
to reflect the overall economic situation of the U.S. in that year. Tenancy rates start to
increase in 1925 in both states (Tables 4a, 4b) and continue on the upswing through the
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Great Depression and into 1940. Rates begin to fall with the economic recovery
occasioned by World War II. In Illinois the decrease in tenancy continued up to 1987
(Table 4b). North Dakota showed a slightly different picture with the decline continuing
only until 1974. In 1978 tenancy rates had again increased by four percentage points,
from 13 to 17 percent (Table 4a). However, the rates remained fairly stable up to the
1987 census.

Table 4a. Tenure of Ownership and Average Size of Farm for North Dakota:
1920 to 1987
Year

Full
Owner

1920

43.8%

29.4%

25.6%

1.1%

1925

34.7%

30.5%

34.4%

.48%

1930

30.5%

33.7%

35.1 %

.60%

1935

30.5%

30.0%

39.2%

.40%

1940

25.2%

29.4%

45.1%

.30%

1945

31.9%

40.0%

27.8%

.40%

1950

39.0%

39.0%

21.9%

.20%

1954

38.0%

41.2%

20.4%

.15%

1959

36.0%

44.5%

18.8%

.35%

1964

36.5%

47.0%

16.1 %

NA

1969

40.5%

46.6%

14.4%

NA

1974

39.4%

47.2%

13.4%

NA

1978

34.6%

48.2%

17.2%

NA

1982

34.1%

48.8%

17.1%

NA

1987

32.4%

49.7

17.9%

NA

Part

Owner

Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding.

Tenant

Manager
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The question with tenancy, whatever the rates, is how many tenants move into
part-ownership or full-ownership. If the number of farmers remained the same year after
year one could argue that declines in tenancy indicated movement of tenants up the
ladder to part-owners or owners. However, the number of farmers in both states for
every census period except the 1925 to 1935 period has declined therefore some of these
tenants must be leaving the land. It is notable that in the five years after 1935, the year
of the second highest tenancy rates in North Dakota, the state experienced the highest
percentage decline in number of farm operators between any of the census periods under
examination (Table 1). A similar trend occurred in Illinois although it was not quite as
marked.
While the proportions and numbers of tenants in each state have declined the
proportions of part-owners have increased. In 1920 only thirteen percent of Illinois farm
operators were part-owners but by 1987 part-owners had increased to over two-thirds
(36.6%) of all farm operators (Table 4a). North Dakota also evidenced an increase in the
percentage of part-owners almost as large. While North Dakota part-owners made up
about thirty percent (29.4%) of farm operators in 1920, by 1987 they had expanded to
form one-half (49.7%) of all operators (Table 4a).
Rates of full ownership have moved up and down between 1920 and 1987. In
Illinois full-ownership rates have varied from a high of 47 percent in 1974 to a low of
38 percent in 1935. By 1987 Illinois full-owners made up almost the same proportion of
farmers that they did in 1920 (Table 4b). In North Dakota full-ownership rates ranged
from a high of 44 percent in 1920 to a low of 25 percent in 1940 (Table-4a). By 1987
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full-owners formed a smaller segment of farm operators than they did in 1920. Over twofifths (43.8%) of farmers were full-owners in 1920 but this portion had dropped to about
one-third (32.4%) by 1987.
Table 4b. Tenure of Ownership and Average Size of Farm for Illinois: 1920 to 1987

Year

Full
Owner

Part

Owner

Tenant

Manager

1920

42.5%

13.4%

42.7%

1.40%

1925

42.6%

14.6%

42.0%

.80%

1930

39.7%

16.2%

43.1%

1.00%

1935

37.6%

17.2%

44.5%

.80%

1940

40.8%

15.4%

43.1%

.80%

1945

42.9%

17.3%

39.1%

.80%

1950

44.7%

20.4%

34.6%

.40%

1954

43.1%

21.8%

34.9%

.30%

1959

41.2%

25.1%

33.5%

.30%

1964

41.1%

28.2%

30.4%

NA

1969

45.8%

29.5%

25.1%

NA

1974

47.3%

31.8%

20.9%

NA

1978

43.7%

35.0%

21.5%

NA

1982

43.7%

36.7%

20.0%

NA

1987

44.0%

36.6

19.4%

NA

Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding.

In North Dakota increases in tenancy accompany decreases in full-ownership up
to 1940 (Table 4a). However, after 1940 decreases in full-ownership correlate closely
with increases in part ownership while rates of tenancy continue to decrease or rise only
slightly. If one examines percentage decreases in numbers of full owners and tenants
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from 1945 to 1964 percentage decreases for tenants are greater than for full owners. My
feeling is that tenants are most likely to disappear because they can no longer make a
living off renting land. Conversely, full owners are more likely to "disappear" into the
part-owner category. Full-owners have found it increasingly necessary to expand their
holdings to maintain the same level of income they may have been able to attain in
previous years with smaller amounts of land.
However, economic times for farmers have not been good enough to allow them
to purchase additional land outright so they have resorted to renting to increase their
holdings. This would make sense if one considers that the value of most agricultural
commodities has remained relatively stable in constant dollars since 1920, and for some
commodities has actually declined, while the price of farm input materials such as fuel,
seed, fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, and machinery spiralled ever upward in the
ensuing years. Of course it is impossible to say what takes place at the individual farm
level from the grouped data of the census but the severe reductions in farm operator
numbers do add credence to the above interpretation.
In Illinois a somewhat different pattern of farm tenure emerges over the years.
Where North Dakota exhibited a more wide-ranging level of full-ownership Illinois rates
fluctuated less staying within a range of nine percent (Table 4b). The corresponding
range of fluctuation in North Dakota was 19 percent. In addition, Illinois had higher rates
of full-ownership than North Dakota for every census except that of 1920 (Table 4b).
The level of full-ownership, however, held fairly steady moving up and down between
43 and 47 percent. Conversely, Illinois part-ownership levels have been much lower than
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those in North Dakota for every census although part-ownership rates have increased
more noticeably in Illinois than in North Dakota since 1920. Illinois has experienced a
steady gain in proportions of part-owners from a low of 13 percent in 1920 to a high of
37 percent in 1987 (Table 4b). After 1940 increases in rates of part-ownership in Illinois
correlate more closely with decreases in the incidence of tenancy. For every census after
1940 there was an increase in part-ownership along with a decrease in tenancy rates.
Part-ownership levels rose 19 percent and tenancy rates fell 20 percent.
More important to look at in interpreting tenure of ownership is the proportion
of total farm land each group farms rather than proportions of farm operators in the
above categories. These figures provide a better idea of the size and significance of each
group of farmers. For instance if full-owners comprise 44 percent of all farmers but only
control 20 percent of the land in farms and part owners make up 20 percent of all
farmers but control 40 percent of all land in farms this tells us something about the
relative wealth and well-being of farmers of different tenure status.
Part-owners, in this instance, would probably be better off economically than fullowners (as a group, that is). In addition we could surmise part-owners may be attempting
to work up to purchasing the land they now rent for their future expansion. We might
also expect part-owners to have more heavily invested in machinery since they will need
the aid of machines to farm their larger amounts of land. On a Chayanovian note, we
might anticipate these family farmers to have a larger kin network available to help them
farm their increased acres since Chayanov argues that one reason family farmers increase
their total number of acres is to make use of under-employed kin.
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In both North Dakota and Illinois the amount of farmland farmed by full-owners
and tenants has declined between 1920 and 1987 whereas part-owners have increased
their share of farmland over those years (Tables 5a and 5b). The decline in share of
farmland has been most noticeable for full-owners with their share falling from 36
percent to 19 percent in both states. North Dakota tenants, while also experiencing a loss
in acres farmed did not evidence such a dramatic decline (Table 5a). Their share fell
from 24 percent to 14 percent. Illinois tenants showed a more severe loss than full
owners declining in share from 47 percent to 20 percent of all land in farms (Table 5b).
Part-owners dramatically raised their portion of acres farmed expanding from 38 percent
to 67 percent of all acres farmed in North Dakota and from 15 percent to 60 percent of
all acres farmed in Illinois.
Therefore, many farmers in both states have used increased size, via renting
additional land, as a way of keeping up farm income. As the prices they receive for their
products fail to keep up with their sky-rocketing costs of production farmers find it
necessary to step up their levels of production just to stay even with costs. While many
remaining farmers have increased their land holdings this has not been their only strategy
for enlarging income. Working off their farms for neighbouring farmers or in a non-farm
enterprise also serves as an income supplement. I tum now to patterns of off-farm work
and their meaning for family farmers.
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Table Sa. Percentage of Acres Farmed by Tenure of Operator for North Dakota:
1920 to 1987
Year

Full Owner

Part Owner

Tenants

Managers

1920

36.0%

38.1%

23.6%

2.20%

1925

28.1%

40.4%

30.7%

.79%

1930

22.4%

46.0%

30.9%

1.00%

1935

22.2%

44.6%

32.4%

.80%

1940

17.2%

43.7%

38.5%

.64%

1945

21.7%

54.8%

22.4%

1.10%

1950

28.8%

52.5%

18.0%

.71%

1954

27.3%

54.5%

17.4%

.83%

1959

25.4%

58.2%

15.7%

.74%

1964

24.2%

59.2%

12.4%

NA

1969

25.4%

61.7%

12.9%

NA

1974

25.2%

64.4%

10.4%

NA

1978

22.6%

65.3%

12.1%

NA

1982

23.5%

65.6%

10.8%

NA

1987

19.2%

67.3%

13.5%

NA

Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding.
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Table Sb. Percentage of Acres Farmed by Tenure of Operator for Illinois: 1920 to 1987
Year

Full

Part

Owner

Owner

Tenants

Managers

1920

35.6%

15.3%

46.9%

2.23%

1925

34.1%

17.3%

47.1%

1.46%

1930

29.9%

19.7%

48.7%

1.67%

1935

28.3%

21.1%

49.1%

1.49%

1940

29.4%

21.2%

47.9%

1.47%

1945

28.3%

24.9%

45.2%

1.66%

1950

28.82

28.7%

41.9%

1.17%

1954

27.35

29.7%

41.7%

1.06%

1959

25.0%

34.6%

39.5%

.99%

1964

24.3%

40.4%

35.3%

NA

1969

27.1%

44.4%

28.5%

NA

1974

26.0%

50.6%

23.4%

NA

1978

21.2%

56.5%

22.4%

NA

1982

22.0%

58.2%

19.8%

NA

1987

19.3%

60.4%

20.3%

NA

Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding.

Working Off the Farm: Augmenting Farm Income
One indicator of the economic status of farmers, in terms of how well their
farming operations are doing, is to look at how many of them make an adequate living
from farming without having to rely on off-farm income. One assumes farmers will
choose not to work off the farm if they don't have to. In this analysis I view off-farm
work as an occupation farmers engage in because of economic necessity rather than
choice. Hence in years when farmers find it difficult to make ends meet because of bad
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harvests, heavy debt, or declining commodities prices, they will seek work off-farm to
counter reduced farm income.
Data on off-farm work is available from 1930 to 1987 but strictly comparable
information exists for only eight census periods: 1935, 1940, 1950, 1954, and 1974
through 1987. According to this information it does appear farmers in Illinois and have
increasingly engaged in off-farm work (Table 6a). In 1935 about three-quarters (76.0%)
of all Illinois farmers worked on-farm only and slightly less than one-quarter (24.1 %)
of Illinois farmers worked off-farm. Only four percent worked off-farm 200 or more
days. By 1987 less than one-half (43%) of Illinois farmers worked solely on-farm
whereas almost one-half (49.3%) reported off-farm work. One-fifth of all farmers had
worked off-farm less than 200 days but almost thirty percent spent 200 or more days
working off the farm. Considering there are approximately 252 working days in the year,
200 or more days off-farm work means these "farmers" virtually worked full-time at
another job.
Patterns of off-farm work in North Dakota are not as clear-cut as those in Illinois.
From 1935 to 1987 off-farm work did increase, however, the increase was not consistent
and reflected ups and downs in the rates (Table 6b). Interestingly enough the 1935 data
closely corresponds to the 1987 in levels of on-farm and off-farm work. The 1935 level
may reflect the difficult times wheat farmers experienced during the depression and
drought of the 1930's.
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Table 6a. Percentage of Farmers Working Off-Farm by Numbers of Days
for Illinois: 1935 to 1987
Number of Days of Off-Farm Work

Year

None

1- 49

so -99

100 - 199

200 or more

1935

76%

11%

4%

4%

4%

1940

64%

10%

3%

5%

7%

1950

63%

12%

4%

5%

13%

1954

58%

15%

4%

5%

14%

1974

39%

7%

3%

6%

23%

1978

45%

10%

3%

7%

30%

1982

43%

9%

3%

8%

28%

1987

43%

9%

3%

8%

29%

Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding.

Table 6b. Percentage of Farmers Working Off-Farm by Numbers of Days for
North Dakota: 1935 to 1987
Number of Days of Off-Fann Work

Year

None

1- 49

so - 99

100 - 199

200 or more

1935

57%

33%

5%

3%

2%

1940

72%

13%

3%

2%

3%

1950

75%

14%

3%

3%

5%

1954

72%

14%

3%

3%

5%

1974

49%

9%

3%

5%

9%

1978

55%

14%

4%

7%

13%

1982

53%

12%

4%

7%

·13%

1987

55%

11%

4%

8%

15%

Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding.
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In 1935 about three-fifths (57.0%) of North Dakota farmers devoted no time to
off-farm work while just over two-fifths (43.0%) worked off-farm. Farmers working less
than 200 days off-farm accounted for 41 percent of all farmers and those working 200
or more days off-farm made up only two percent of all farmers. On-farm work reached
its high point in North Dakota in 1950 when three-quarters of all farmers reported no offfarm work.
In that same year about one-fifth of North Dakota farm operators worked from
one to 199 days off-farm and five percent worked off-farm 200 or more days. By 1987
farmers engaged solely in farm work comprised 55 percent of all North Dakota farmers
while those working off-farm made up almost 45 percent of farmers. Slightly over onefifth (22.2 %) of farmers worked less than 200 days off-farm while fifteen percent worked
200 or more days at non-farm occupations.
In comparison, Illinois has had larger proportions of farmers working off farm
than has North Dakota since the 1940 census. While similar proportions of farmers fell
into the categories between one and 199 days of off-farm work for the years between
1940 and 1987 the share of Illinois farmers working off-farm 200 or more days has
always exceeded that of North Dakota. In 1940 only three percent of North Dakota
farmers worked off-farm 200 or more days compared to seven percent in Illinois. In
1987 the comparable figures were 15 percent and 29 percent respectively. By 1987,
therefore, Illinois had twice the proportion of farmers working close to full-time at
another job (200 or more days off-farm work) than North Dakota had.
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The total amount of off-farm work in numbers of days in both states does appear
to be increasing. The proportions of farmers working 100 or more days off farm grew
from 1940 to 1987. One group of farmers seems to be moving in the direction of
spending from one-half a year to almost a full year on off-farm work. In 1987 farmers
most likely to work off-farm were those with smaller values of agricultural sales. Smaller
sales farmers were also more likely to work 100 or more days off-farm than their larger
counterparts. The time spent in off-farm work correlated closely with the market value
of agricultural products sold. As market value of agricultural products sold fell, days of
off-farm work rose. Based on the above comparisons higher proportions of farmers in
1987 in both states find it more difficult to make a living solely through agriculture.
They use off-farm work as a strategy to augment declining farm income.
The likelihood of engaging in off-farm work also relates to tenure of ownership.
In 1987 part-owners were least likely to work off-farm in both states. About two-fifths
(42.2%) of Illinois part-owners and about one third (31.0%) of North Dakota part-owners
engaged in off-farm work. In Illinois the proportions of full owners and tenants working
off farm were about equal standing at 52 percent and 55 percent respectively. Full
owners in Illinois were more likely to work 200 or more days off-farm than tenants with
37 percent of all full owners falling into this category compared to 28 percent of tenants.
In North Dakota the situation was reversed with higher proportions of tenants (52 %) than
full owners (38%) working off-farm. However, full-owners and tenants were equally
likely to work 200 or more days off farm with one-fifth (21.1 %) in each group falling
into this category.
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Therefore, the data on off-farm work also suggests, as did the previous data on
acres farmed (Table 5), that part-owners are economically better off than full owners or
tenants in both states. They not only control more land but also find it possible to obtain
more of their income from farming than do full owners and tenants. Of course farmers
may engage in off-farm work out of more than dire economic necessity. However, based
on the example of my farming relatives, off-farm work is "necessary" for two reasons:
to improve or expand the farm and to keep their income in the middle ranges. They
could do without it but it would mean maintaining the farm at it's present level of
intensification and size and forgoing things like vacations, home improvements, and
entertainment.

Agricultural Modes of Production:
Family Labour Farms and Farm Comorations

Classical Marxists predict a few family farmers will expand their holdings enough
to form a rural bourgeoisie - a class of capitalist farmers relying primarily on wage
labour. The majority of family farmers, however, will fall into a landless state and
become part of an emerging rural proletariat dependent on the new capitalist farmers for
agricultural jobs. Dependency models of family farming, however, predict an incomplete
transformation of the agricultural sector. They argue family farmers will continue to
exist as land holders but their condition will vary depending on the state of the larger
economy. They see family farmers as surviving in capitalist economies but as moving
into a state of "propertied labourers" in which the farmer owns his part of his means of
production, e.g., land and machinery, but finds his control over what to produce and
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how to produce it eroded by the purchaser of his crop, e.g., food corporations. For
instance, analyzes of family farmers in Wisconsin who specialize in field crops and
vegetables suggest some of these producers give up much of the autonomy of production
they once had because they increasingly enter into contract farming arrangements with
agribusiness firms (Mooney 1982; Pfeffer 1982).
To examine both the classical Marxist predictions and the "dependency"
predictions I have analyzed data on the type of organization of farms from 1969 to
1987. 1 Organizational information collected by the agricultural census divides farms into
four major categories: individual (or family) farms, partnerships, corporations, and other.
In 1978 corporations were further divided into family and non-family corporations. The
census then partitions each corporate division into two categories: those with ten or fewer
stockholders and those with more than ten stockholders (Tables 7a, 7b).
If corporate farms and capitalist farms are synonymous, as Marxists assume, then

increases in the numbers of such farms support the Marxist model of the development
of farming in capitalist economies. While presuming corporate farms are necessarily
capitalist farms may not be a valid assumption let us examine the data on type of farm
organization in this vein for the time being to see how farm structure has changed over
the past 18 years. 2

1

2

Data on the number of corporate farms is not available before 1969.

Capitalist farms, as defined by Marxists, rely on hired labour for actual production of farm
commodities while the owner of the farm acts as a manager, CEO, or even as an absentee
landlord. While corporate farms of this nature do exist in the U.S. those in North Dakota and
Illinois deviate from this model. These corporate farms follow a "working-owner" model in
which shareholders actively participate in running the enterprise at all levels, from management
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Looking initially at North Dakota, family farms still make up the majority of all
farms in the state (Table 7). In 1987 almost nine-tenths (88.3%) of all North Dakota
farms remained under family control. This represents an increase from 1969 when the
corresponding figure stood at 85 percent. 3 The share of farmland controlled by family
farmers during this period held steady at slightly over four fifths of all land in farms.
Partnerships, like family farms, have remained a fairly stable proportion of all farms
ranging from a high of 14 percent in 1969 to a low of nine percent in 1974. In 1987
partnerships accounted for just over ten percent of all farms. The amount of land in
farms held by partnerships decreased from 17 percent of all land in farms in 1969 to 13
percent in 1987.
Corporate farms have increased in number and in proportion of all farms (Table
7a). However, the increase has been neither steady nor dramatic. In 1969 corporate
farms made up about two tenths of one percent of all farms and accounted for four tenths

to production. Most North Dakota and Illinois corporate farms are family corporations. From
Drache's (1976) descriptions they seem like "overgrown" family farms where two or three
generations of the same family collectively own the farm, work at all levels of production. Some
have expanded and intensified to an extent where they've run out of kin to fill their labour needs
and have had to hire "outsiders".
3

Data on type of organization for 1969 and 1974 are not strictly comparable with data
collected from 1978 through 1987 since 1969 and 1974 information pertains to farms with sales
of $2,500 or more. The 1978 to 1987 data on type of organization represents all farms,
excluding only abnormal farms. Levels of family farm organization may have been higher in
1969 and 1974 since those farms selling less than $2,500 in agricultural products were more
likely to be family farms than partnerships or corporations. The counts are not likely to be
drastically different, however, since the number of farms excluded by the $2,500 qualification
total 4,853 in 1969 and 2,049 in 1974. Assuming all these farms were family farms including
them increases the proportion of family farms by two percent in 1969 and four tenths of one
percent in 1974.
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of all land in farms. Over the succeeding 18 years they increased to eight tenths of one
percent of all farms and controlled slightly over one percent of all land in farms. Family
corporations of less than ten shareholders comprised the vast majority of all corporate
farms. Taken as a group North Dakota corporate farms, family and non-family, make
up only three tenths of one percent of all corporate farms in the United States.
Interestingly enough the "Other" category, while not significantly changing its
proportion of farms, has shown a steady increase in land in farms. This category is a
catch-all and includes co-operative farms, estates, trusts, agricultural research stations,
and penitentiary farms. Between 1969 and 1987 their share of North Dakota farmland
increased from four tenths of one percent to almost four percent (Table 7a).

Table 7a. Percentages of Farms by Farm Organization for North Dakota: 1969 to 1987
Corporation
Year

Corporation

Family
Non-Family
Family Partnership _s.10 Shares > 10 Shares _s.10 Shares> 10 Shares

Other

1969 Farms

85.3%

14.0%

.21%

.020%

***

***

.47%

Acres

82.3%

16.9%

.41%

.013%

***

***

.44%

1974 Farms

90.3%

9.3%

.20%

***

***

***

.20%

Acres

82.3%

12.2%

.36%

***

***

***

.25%

1978 Farms

87.8%

11.6%

.28%

.010%

.27%

.005%

.31%

Acres

81.5%

14.4%

.51%

.040%

.04%

na

3.53%

1982 Farms

86.4%

11.9%

.45%

.008%

.05%

.003%

.46%

Acres

81.0%

14.4%

.83%

.002%

.04%

na

3.75%

1987 Farms

88.3%

10.5%

.77%

.003%

.05%

.003%

.43%

Acres

82.1%

13.0%

1.20%

na

.04%

na

3.70%

***: Corporate data for 1969 and 1974 groups family and non-family.
Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding.
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In Illinois, as in North Dakota, family farms continue to make up the greatest
proportion of farms constituting 85 percent of all farms in 1987. This share has remained
relatively stable since 1969 when family farms made up 84 percent of all farms (Table
7b). The portion of land in farms controlled by family farmers fluctuated slightly ranging
from a high of 84 percent in 1974 to a lows of 78 percent in 1982 and 1987. Partnerships
exhibited similar stability in their share of all farms ranging from 15 to 10 percent. The
proportion of land in farms held by partnerships moved up and down between a high of
18 percent in 1960 to a low of 14 percent in 1974. In 1987 partnerships controlled 16
percent of all Illinois farmland.

Table 7b. Percentages of Farms by Farm Organization for Illinois: 1969 to 1987
Corporation
Year

Corporation

Family
Non-Family
Family Partnership ~10 Shares > 10 Shares ~10 Shares > 10 Shares Other

1969 Farms

83.8%

14.9%

.53%

.06%

***

***

.74%

Acres

80.0%

18.1 %

1.10%

.25%

***

***

.69%

1974 Farms

88.9%

10.2%

.60%

***

***

***

.30%

Acres

84.3%

13.9%

1.50%

***

***

***

.34%

1978 Farms

86.2%

12.1%

1.00%

.04%

.15%

.04%

.46%

Acres

79.6%

16.7%

2.60%

.15%

.30%

.23%

.49%

1982 Farms

85.0%

12.4%

1.60%

.04%

.18%

.05%

.67%

Acres

78.1%

16.4%

4.20%

.15%

.28%

.19%

.65%

1987 Farms

84.9%

12.0%

2.20%

.03%

.17%

.04%

.67%

Acres

78.2%

15.9%

5.00%

na

.34%

na

.58%

***:

Corporate data for 1969 and 1974 groups family and non-family.
Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding.
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Illinois does differ from the North Dakota in some aspects of farm organization.
First, Illinois shows a greater share of farms held under corporate auspices and a
somewhat greater ratio of farmland under corporate control (Table 7b). Three percent
of all Illinois farms are organized as corporations and these farms account for slightly
over five percent of all farmland in the state. Within the corporate category Illinois has
higher proportions of non-family farm corporations than North Dakota. As a group,
Illinois farm corporations comprise three percent of all corporate farms in the country
compared to North Dakota's three tenths of one percent share. While Illinois has a
slightly larger portion of "Other" farms as a percentage of all farms these farms
constitute a smaller percentage of land in farms than do their North Dakota counterparts.
While the proportions of corporate farms have increased over the past 18 years
in both North Dakota and Illinois they still make up a very small segment of all farms
in both states. Furthermore Drache's (1976) analysis of corporate family farms in the
midwest suggests some of these farms are carryovers from large estates established as
early as the 1880's. Most of these early capitalist farms were established by wealthy
Eastern families who received land for their stock in the Northern Pacific Railway
(Drache 1976: 167). They came to own huge chunks of land, much of it in the Red River
valley, averaging between 60,000 and 80,000 acres.
Since the agricultural census did not collect data on corporate farm organization
until 1974 there is no statistical record of trends in farm organization. Drache (1976: 167)
notes that 100 of these very large farms organized on a capitalist basis, e.g., operating
for profit and employing primarily hired labour, existed during the late 1_9th and early
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20th centuries in the Red River valley section of North Dakota and Minnesota. His
historical analysis is confined to the valley and I have no comparable historical
information on large farming enterprises in Illinois.
According to Drache these farms all employed managers and the census did
collect data on the number of farm managers from 1920 until 1959 (Tables 4a, 4b). If
I use managed farms as a proxy for corporate farms then the percentage of corporate
farms in North Dakota has really changed very little since 1920. In 1920 managed farms
comprised one percent of all farms (Table 4a). In 1987 corporate farms made up eighttenths of one percent of all North Dakota farms. Using managed farms as a substitute for
corporate farms in Illinois shows "capitalist" farms have increased by only one percent
in 57 years, from slightly over one percent in 1920 (Table 4b) to just over two percent
in 1987 (Tables 7a, 7b).
About the loss of actual farm numbers one cannot argue. There have been
dramatic decreases in both North Dakota and Illinois since 1920. However, the decreases
in both states are lower than that for the country as a whole with North Dakota
evidencing the smallest decline (Tables 7a, 7b). To argue that corporations are coming
to dominate farm numbers in these states, however, is not warranted by the data. Instead
individual family farmers still make up the vast majority of farmers and their share of
all farms has shown great stability since 1920. In addition, the data on farm size by
organization for both North Dakota and Illinois show an increase in the average size of
family farms and partnerships but a decrease in average size of corporate farms (Table

9).
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Table 8. Decreases in Farm Numbers: 1920 to 1987
1920 Farms

1987 Farms Percent Decrease

United States

6,448,343

2,087,759

-67.6%

North Dakota

77,690

35,289

-54.5%

237,181

88,786

-62.5%

Illinois

Although corporate farms only make up a small proportion of farms one should
not judge their importance simply on the basis of numbers. As Drache (1976), Ehrensaft
(1980), and Havens (1985) point out these farms have a significance beyond their
numbers in that they can influence farm labour patterns, production techniques, and
marketing methods simply because of their magnitude of production and sales. Therefore,
these entities deserve closer examination in order to determine how they fit into the
agricultural order and what they augur for family farming. The next section examines
trends in hired farm labour and production methods as they relate to farm organization.

Table 9. Average Size of Farms by Organization: 1969 to 1987
North Dakota

Family

Partnership

Corporation

1969 average size

937 acres

1,173 acres

1,776 acres

1987 average size

1,062 acres

1,423 acres

1,760 acres

Illinois
1969 average size
1987 average size

Corporation

Family

Partnership

270 acres

344 acres

1,128 acres

425 acres

717 acres

296 acres
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Hired Farm Labour and Mechanization:
Usin~ Live and "Dead" Labour
Marxists predict an increase in the number of agricultural labourers (a growing
rural proletariat) as capitalism moves into agricultural production. For them
developments in agriculture simply mirror earlier changes in industry. If the Marxist
model of agricultural development in capitalist countries is "correct" we should expect
to see growing use of hired farm labourers on corporate farms.
Sociologists following the neo-classical approach to agricultural also use an
industrial model in speculating about farm labour. However, they foresee a heavily
mechanized agriculture, similar to the mechanization that has taken place in American
industry, enabling corporate farmers to lower their labour requirements and decrease
their production costs. They stipulate that corporate farmers will try to lower their
production costs by decreasing their need for human labour.
The agricultural census has tracked the value of hired farm labour since 1920.
However, the data are strictly comparable for only the 1954 to 1987 period because of
sampling differences. A comparison of constant dollar amounts expended on farm labour
over this 33 year period shows that there has been no trend for farmers as a group to use
more farm labour (Table 10) in either North Dakota or Illinois.
In North Dakota there was a $200,000 increase from 1954 to 1987. This did not
reflect a steady increase over the years but rather an up and down movement with its
apex in 1978. Illinois farmers actually spent less on hired farm labour in 1987 than they
did in 1954. As with North Dakota, the value of hired farm labour evidenced no trend
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either way, falling in one census period only to rise in the next and then drop again. The
overall data on hired farm labour does not support the Marxist prediction of increases in
the amount of hired labour on farms as a group. However, it is impossible to tell from
this grouped data if increasing and decreasing dollar amounts correspond to actual
numbers of farm workers, e.g., we have no way of knowing if, for instance, an increase
in total dollar amount spent on hired labour represents more labourers or more labour
by those already in the agricultural labour market.

Table 10. Value of Hired Farm Labour in Thousands of Constant Dollars:
1954 to 1987
(1982-84= 100)
Year

North Dakota

Illinois

1954

$94,040

$250,619

1959

$77,700

$245,757

1964

$80,552

$247,232

1969

$89,715

$247,390

1974

$96,830

$239,694

1978

$108,378

$293,917

1982

$79,554

$233,724

1987

$96,097

$242,113

Breaking down hired farm labour by type of farm organization gives some support
to the Marxist contention that a group of capitalist farmers relying more and more on
agricultural wage labour is developing. These breakdowns show that corporate farms,
whether they be family corporations or non-family corporations, do depend on greater
amounts of hired labour than do individual/family farmers or partnerships (Tables l la,
llb). Whether capitalist farmers employ their hired help over longer periods or whether
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they hire more bodies cannot be deduced from the census data but they spend a greater
proportion of all money for hired farm labour than their numbers warrant.
While individual or family farms make up the largest percentage of farms using
hired labour their share of the dollar amount of this labour is lower than their numbers
would imply. Conversely, while corporate farms make up the smallest proportion of all
farms using hired labour their share of the dollar amount of hired labour is higher than
one would expect from their numbers. The surface interpretation would be that corporate
farms use more hired labourers than individual family farms since these farmers spend
more money on labour. However, this neglects the rate of pay for agricultural workers .

•
One could just as easily argue that greater dollar amounts spent on hired labour by
corporate farmers simply represent higher wages paid to agricultural labourers on
corporate farms.

Table lla. Value of Hired Farm Labour for North Dakota by Type of Farm
Organization: 1974 and 1987
1974
Farms

$1,000's

1987
Farms

Individual

89.7%

79.1%

88.3%

69.7%

Partnership

9.7%

16.6%

9.9%

19.0%

Corporation - Total Family

.35%

3.6%

1.5%

10.3%

Corporation - Family ..s._10
Shareholders

a

a

1.5%

a

Corporation - Total Nonfamily

a

a

.05%

.31%

Corporation -Nonfamily ..s._10
Shareholders

a

a

.05%

a

Type of Fann

1974

1987
$1,000's
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Table llb. Value of Hired Farm Labour for Illinois by Type of Farm
Organization: 1974 and 1987
1974

1974

1987

1987

Type of Fann

Farms

$1,000's

Farms

$1,000's

Individual

86.6%

63.1%

83.6%

50.7%

Partnership

11.8%

13.1 %

12.5%

15.8%

Corporation - Total Family

1.3%

23.4%

3.8%

24.5%

Corporation - Family .S.,10
Shareholders

a

a

3.7%

24.2%

Corporation - Total Nonfamily

a

a

.36%

7.3%

Corporation - Nonfamily .S.,10
Shareholders

a

a

.30%

5.1%

Drache's (1976) description of midwest corporate farms suggests a combination
of all three factors. The corporate farms he examined paid relatively good wages
compared to wages offered in the community as a whole. In addition, corporate farmers
did hire more workers and hired some of them for longer periods of time. This resulted
not so much from land size but from the intensification of corporate farms through
diversification and continuous (year-round) livestock production. Diversification meant
corporate farmers had more irons in the fire and hence needed more people to manage
these many enterprises. Intensification, usually through continuous livestock production
meant they needed some workers year round instead of at peak periods of harvest only.
Hence a 1,000 acre grain farm required less labour than a diversified, more intense 1,000
acre grain/pasture livestock farm which, in tum, required less labour than a diversified,
highly intense 1,000 acre grain/pasture-feedlot livestock farm.
Although the statistical information of the census shows the agricultural
"proletariat" has not increased in dollar value since 1954, by 1987 corporate farmers
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were employing higher proportions of them than they were in 1954. Drache's
observations suggest present day corporate farmers are also employing these workers at
higher rates of pay and for longer periods of time than family farmers or farmers in
partnerships.
An additional factor comes into play in considering labour requirements on family
versus corporate farms. It relates to the amount of "drudgery" farm workers are willing
to endure. Even Drache, with his obvious preference for corporate farm organization,
admits labour costs disadvantage corporate farmers in relation to family farmers. Early
capitalist farmers complained hired help did not want to work the long hours or the
intense pace of harvest schedules since they didn't have a personal stake in the farming
operation. Family farmers, their wives, and children willingly committed to such
conditions because their fortunes rose and fell with their farm.
These same early capitalist farmers also lamented their inability to control the
labour pace of hired help in unsupervised settings such as field work. Wrote one to his
son at an Eastern college, "When one hires labor on a farm the owner has no way of
checking up to see that they do a full day's work. It is very easy for them to shirk their
work, lay down on a hay or straw stack and go to sleep. A man working for Henry Ford
... has hardly time to tum around ... " (George Baldwin, quoted in Drache 1976: 187).
Later twentieth century corporate farmers have found that by diversifying into
controlled environment livestock operations they can confine not only the livestock, but
also their workers, to an easily supervised area. They can also offer workers year round
employment rather than seasonal work. Controlled livestock environments require steady
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work rather than the hectic, intense labour of grain harvests. The largest corporate farm
in Iowa, Garst Farms, employs 35 full-time workers year round for their beef feedlot
operation (Drache 1976:241). All the corporate farmers Drache interviewed had invested
· in large-scale machinery for the grain and field crop part of their operations, preferring
to rely on the more easily controlled productive capacity of machines than of hired
labour.
So corporate farmers are using more hired labour than they were in 1974 but
probably for their livestock operations rather than their grain/field crop production. For
grain and field crop work they have invested heavily in machinery or "dead labour". At
the time Drache interviewed mid-western corporate farmers the investment per worker
in agriculture was $56,000 (Drache 1976:473). Larger machinery has also made family
farmers less dependent on hiring help. Mechanization then has enabled all farmers to cut
labour needs for grain and field crop production. However, livestock/ poultry production
and dairying, while also becoming less labour intensive because of mechanization, still
remain more dependent on human labour than grain/field crop production.
Corporate farmers have influenced the production methods of grain and field crop
farming and, through them, the use of hired labour on farms in North Dakota and
Illinois. Twentieth century corporate family farmers like Tom Campbell in Montana,
Roswell Garst in Iowa, Bert Hanson in North Dakota, and Frank Keine in Minnesota had
access to more capital in their early years of farming. They put this capital to work in
purchasing, or in one case developing, innovative machinery to cut their labour costs.
They were the first to mechanize, on a large scale, wheat, corn, alfalfa, and potato
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production respectively. Their increases in production both encouraged and forced other
less wealthy farmers to adopt this machinery (Drache 1976). Those farmers who could
not afford to keep up, at least minimally, with the mechanization innovations of these
larger farms were increasingly marginalized.
Therefore, corporate farmers have not only swayed production technique decisions
for all farmers but they have also come to dominate some types of production not so
much in terms of numbers but in terms of value of market sales. I turn now to an
description of the type of farms associated with the production of specific agricultural
commodities to examine dependency predictions about the evolution of family and
corporate farms.

High Risk and Low Return: Who's Raising What?

Central to the argument of dependency theorists is the assertion that capitalists
avoid certain areas of agricultural production because they are too risky or offer too low
a return in investment. This behaviour, they believe, provides a niche for family farmers
in capitalist economies. Family farmers are willing to take the risks and accept the low
return inherent in the production of certain agricultural commodities because they do not
calculate their well-being via a profit perspective. Rather they are concerned with the
total income they can derive from their venture. Income depends to a great degree on
how well farm families can exploit their own labour. As long as the total income they
receive from their farm enables them to maintain an acceptable level of subsistence
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without unacceptable levels of self-exploitation farm families will keep on farming
regardless of their level of "profit".
Dependency theorists have singled out grain farming, especially in the great plains
region, as an example of an extremely high risk and low return enterprise. Hence they
have hypothesized that this area of agricultural production would be less susceptible to
capitalist incursions. They have also noted the high level of self-exploitation dairy
farmers engage in and for this reason have pegged dairying as a low return production
not attractive to capitalist operation. To test these hypotheses I have examined the types
of commodities produced by family farmers versus corporate farmers. If, as dependency
theorists predict, capitalists avoid high-risk, low-return enterprises corporate farms should
concentrate in lower-risk, higher-return types of agricultural enterprises.
We should expect North Dakota, a great plains state exhibiting some of the most
precarious conditions in the country for agriculture, e.g., drought, early frost, insect
plagues, and a heavy reliance on wheat production, to have fewer than average corporate
farms. We should also find that those corporate farms existing in the state concentrate
their production in less risky types of commodities, not wheat or other uncertain cash
grain crops.
Illinois has a less hazardous climate than North Dakota and hence less risk of crop
failure due to weather conditions. In addition soil and climatic conditions favour a wider
variety of agricultural produce than North Dakota. Hence the expectation is that Illinois
will have more corporate farms than North Dakota and these farms will also concentrate
on raising products whose growth is more easily controlled than cash grain crops such
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as horticultural specialties, animal specialties, or poultry and egg products. However,
both states should have lower proportions of corporate farms than the U.S. as a whole
since neither area is ideal for corporate farming.
The Census of Agriculture divides farms among ten commodities categories based
on the value of products sold. The categories are as follows: cash grains, field crops,
vegetables and melons, fruits and tree nuts, horticultural specialties, livestock and animal
specialties, dairy farms, poultry and eggs, animal specialties, and general farms. The
method used to assign farms to a group is based on the value of agricultural products
sold. For example, farms deriving 50 percent or more of their sales from one type of
commodity, e.g., grain, are classed as cash grain farms. Farms not deriving 50 percent
or more from one of the specific categories are classed as general farms. Seven of the
major categories have subdivisions, for instance, the cash grain category is divided into
five sub-categories: wheat, rice, com, soybeans, and cash grains n.e.c. (not elsewhere
classified).
As noted above, Illinois and North Dakota differ in the type of agricultural
commodities they produce. In terms of grains Illinois farmers primarily produce com and
soybeans for their cash crops while North Dakota farmers rely overwhelmingly on wheat
as their cash commodity with oats and barley distant seconds. In addition livestock
operations constitute a significant portion of farms in both states with Illinois livestock
farmers concentrating on hog raising and North Dakota farmers on cattle ranching.
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There have been changes in the proportions of farms devoted to particular types
of production over the time4 • Illinois, however, exhibits more change than does North
Dakota. The big change in Illinois has been the shift to more cash grain farming. In 1950
only three tenths (31 %) of all Illinois farms fell into the cash-grain group. This category
continued to expand its share of all farms and in 1987 over six tenths (64%) of all farms
were classified as cash grain farms.
Except for a hiatus period between 1959 and 1969 livestock farms retained a
stable share of all Illinois farms comprising about one-quarter of all farms in other census
years. Groups showing declines were general farms, dairy farms, and poultry/egg farms.
Of these general farms decreased the most falling from 13 percent of all farms in 1950
to about two percent of all farms in 1987. Dairy farms dwindled from eight percent to
three percent of all farms and poultry/egg farms, never a large group in Illinois, fell
from about two percent to three tenths of one percent in the same period.
In contrast, North Dakota farms showed less variation in type over the 1950 to
1987 period. Cash grain farms remained the major farm type in North Dakota making
up 60 percent of all farms in 1950 and 58 percent of all farms in 1987. In 1959 the
portion of these farms did drop to 51 percent but this figure may be an artifact of the
sampling procedure used in that year to collect data on type of farm. 5 Cash grain farms'
share of all farms rebounded by the next census when they had increased to 63 percent

4

5

Data on classification of farms covers the 1950 census to the 1987 census.

The 1959 numbers for North Dakota farms by type of classification ar~ not strictly
comparable with earlier or later data because of the sampling procedure used to gather this
information.
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of all farms. Livestock operations increased over this 37 year period but the increase
was not steady. In 1950 livestock operations comprised 16 percent of all farms but by
1987 they had expanded to a 29 percent share. Field crop farms increased from one
percent of all farms in 1950 to four percent of all farms in 1987. Dairy farms retained
a stable share of all farms comprising four percent of all farms in 1950 and the same
proportion in 1987. General farms declined in proportion falling from 15 percent of all
farms in 1950 to only three percent of all farms in 1987.
Overall then there have not been major shifts in the type of production in either
state although there has been a movement away from generalized production to a more
specialized kind of farming according to census categorizations of

II

specialized

11
•

However, changes have occurred in the type of farms that produce certain commodities.
Data on commodities production by type of farm organization was first collected in 1974
and the agricultural census has continued to compile this information over the past 13
years. This data gives a picture of the kind of commodities favoured by corporate
farmers, farmers in partnerships, and individual farmers.

Commodities Production of North Dakota Corporate Farms

In 1974, almost two-fifths (38.0%) of North Dakota corporate farms specialized
in cash grain farming, primarily wheat farming (Table 12a). About one-fifth (20.3%) of
corporate farmers were classed as field crop farms and concentrated their production in
either potatoes, sugar beets, or oilseeds. One quarter (25.3%) of all corporate farmers
specialized in livestock production, primarily beef cattle. Less important corporate
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concerns were the categories of animal specialties, horticultural specialties, general
farms, vegetable/fruit and nut farms, and dairy farms.
By 1987 things had changed somewhat (Table 12b). Cash grain farms grew to just
over two-fifths (43.0%) of all corporate farms and field crops to over one-quarter
(27.0%). Livestock farms fell to one-fifth of all corporate farms. Dairy farms increased
their share by about two percent. Poultry and egg farms, previously non-existent in
corporate terms, made up about one percent (1.5%) of corporate farms. General farms,
animal specialties, horticultural specialties, and vegetable/fruit and nut farms declined.

Table 12a. Specialty Types of 1974 North Dakota Farms Expressed as
a Proportion of All Farms in their Organizational Category
Fann Specialty

Family

Partnership

Corporation

Other

Grain Farms

71.3%

67.2%

38.0%

67.1%

Field Crops

4.2%

5.8%

20.3%

7.6%

Livestock

14.9%

16.7%

25.3%

15.2%

Dairy Farms

3.5%

3.8%

1.3%

1.3%

Poultry/Egg Farms

.15%

.05%

--

--

General Farms

5.6%

6.0%

1.3%

3.8%

Animal Specialties

.21%

.08%

7.6%

1.3%

Horticultural Specialties

.07%

.34%

5.1%

2.5%

Vegetable, Fruit and Nut

.01%

.03%

1.3%

--
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Table 12b. Specialty Types of 1987 North Dakota Farms Expressed as
a Proportion of all Farms in their Organizational Category
Fann Specialty

Family
Non-Family
Family Partnership Corporation Corporation Other

Grain Farms

58.0%

59.0%

43.6%

35.0%

41.7%

Field Crops

3.8%

5.5%

27.8%

15.0%

10.6%

29.0%

26.7%

18.0%

25.0%

34.4%

3.8%

4.5%

2.2%

10.0%

2.0%

.3%

.3%

.7%

5.0%

.7%

General Farms

3.3%

2.7%

2.6%

--

9.3%

Animal Specialties

1.6%

1.0%

3.7%

5.0%

--

Horticultural Specialties

.2%

.1%

3.7%

--

1.3%

Vegetable, Fruit and Nut

.1 %

.2%

.4%

--

--

Livestock
Dairy Farms
Poultry/Egg Farms

However, if we look at corporate farms as a proportion of all farms in a
particular specialty a somewhat different picture emerges. Although two-fifths of
corporate farms in 1974 were cash grain farms these corporate enterprises made up only
one-tenth of one percent of all cash grain farms in North Dakota (Table 13a). Corporate
farms made up a slightly greater proportion of field crop specialty farms comprising
about eight tenths of one percent of these farms. Their share of livestock farms, dairy
farms, and general farms were all under one percent. Corporate farms only had
significant shares of farms in the categories of animal specialties (6. 8 %) , horticultural
specialties (9.3%), and vegetable/fruit and nut farms (14.3%).
By 1987 corporate farms had increased in proportion in all classes except animal
specialties and vegetable/fruit and nut farms. The biggest increase came in the area of
horticultural specialty farms where corporate farms rose from a nine percent share to a
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16 percent one (Table 13b). Their share of field crop farms rose from about one percent
to five percent, poultry and egg farms from zero to four percent, and cash grain farms
from one tenth of one percent to just under two percent. Shares of livestock, dairy, and
general farms also rose but the increases were less than one percent in each category.
Animal specialties *fell from a share of about seven percent in 1974 to a two percent
share in 1987. Vegetable/fruit and nut farms fell from a fourteen percent share in 1974
to a two percent share in 1987.

Table 13a. Proportions of Types of North Dakota Farms by Production Specialty 1974
Fann Specialty

Family

Grain Farms

90.9%

Field Crops

Partnership

Corporation

Other

8.8%

.10%

.18%

86.6%

12.2%

.88%

.33%

Livestock

89.2%

10.3%

.33%

.20%

Dairy Farms

89.8%

10.0%

.07%

.07%

Poultry/Egg Farms

96.5%

3.5%

--

--

General Farms

90.0%

9.8%

.04%

.13%

Animal Specialties

88.6%

3.4%

6.8%

1.1%

Horticultural Specialties

55.8%

30.2%

9.3%

4.7%

Vegetable, Fruit and Nut

71.0%

14.3%

14.3%

--

The data on corporate farms in North Dakota conform in some respects to
dependency theorists predictions about the nature of corporate farming. Greater
proportions of these farms, as a percentage of all farms, fall into more controllable
production categories, e.g., horticultural specialties, poultry and eggs, and field crops.
While field crops such as potatoes, sugar beets, and oilseed crops would seem to be high
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risk crops in a climate like that of North Dakota it appears that most of these crops are
raised in the Red River Valley area. The valley has three advantages for those lucky
enough to have farmland there: rich alluvial soils, higher amounts of rainfall than the rest
of the state, and access to irrigation - a technique farmers on the high plains find difficult
to engage in. All three factors take uncertainty out of production.

Table 13b. Proportions of Types of North Dakota Farms by Production Specialty 1987
Family
Non-Family
Partnership Corporation Corporation

Fann Speciality

Family

Grain Farms

88.4%

10.7%

1.6%

.03%

.31%

Field Crops

79.7%

13.7%

5.1%

.20%

1.1%

Livestock

89.2%

9.7%

.48%

.OS%

.51%

Dairy Farms

87.0%

12.2%

.44%

.15%

.22%

Poultry/Egg Farms

83.2%

11.6%

2.1%

2.1%

1.1%

General Farms

89.5%

8.7%

.62%

--

1.2%

Animal Specialties

91.2%

6.8%

1.8%

.18%

--

Horticultural Specialties

75.0%

6.3%

15.6%

--

3.1%

Vegetable, Fruit and Nut

85.7%

12.2%

2.0%

--

--

Other

Commodities Production of Cor.porate Farms in Illinois

Corporate farm production patterns in Illinois differ from those of North Dakota.
In 1974 corporate farms' production specialties as a percentage of all corporate farms
showed that the most important categories were cash grains, livestock, and horticultural
specialties. Two fifths (39. 8 %) of all corporate farms fell into the cash grain category,
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almost one-quarter (23.0%) were classed as livestock operations, and about one-fifth
(19.3%) were listed as horticultural specialty farms (Table 14a).
By 1987 there had been a large increase in the proportion of corporate farms
classed as cash grain (Table 14b). They now made up almost three fifths (59.3%) of all
corporate farms while livestock operations fell to one fifth (19.6%) and horticultural
specialties to one tenth (9.3%) of all corporate farms. Corporate cash grain farms
concentrated their production in corn and soybeans while corporate livestock farms
primarily raised hogs.

Table 14a. Specialty Types of 1974 Illinois Farms Expressed as
a Proportion of All Farms in their Organizational Category
Fann Specialty

Family Partnership Corporation

Other

Grain Farms

70.2%

60.5%

39.8%

78.8%

Field Crops

.52%

.26%

.74%

.69%

21.7%

28.1%

23.0%

16.1%

Dairy Farms

4.2%

7.3%

2.8%

2.1%

Poultry/Egg Farms

.47%

.54%

7.6%

1.0%

General Farms

1.4%

1.4%

1.1%

.69%

Animal Specialties

.31%

.15%

1.7%

--

Horticultural Specialties

.46%

.86%

19.3%

.34%

Vegetable, Fruit and Nut

.55%

.56%

3.9%

.34%

Livestock
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Table 14b. Specialty Types of 1987 Illinois Farms Expressed as
a Proportion of all Farms in their Organizational Category
Fann Specialty

Family
Non-Family
Family Partnership Corporation Corporation Other

Grain Farms

64.2%

61.1%

60.4%

48.1%

72.6%

1.9%

1.0%

1.4%

1.1%

2.0%

25.3%

27.3%

19.3%

22.5%

16.8%

2.6%

5.9%

3.1%

2.1%

3.4%

.3%

.4%

.6%

3.7%

.3%

General Farms

1.8%

1.4%

1.3%

1.6%

1.4%

Animal Specialties

2.4%

1.3%

2.8%

4.3%

1.4%

Horticultural Specialties

.5%

.7%

9.3%

14.4%

1.5%

Vegetable, Fruit and Nut

1.0%

.9%

1.8%

2.1%

.7%

Field Crops

Livestock
Dairy Farms
Poultry/Egg Farms

A different view of corporate farms emerges if we look at corporate farms by
specialty as a percentage of all farms in that specialty (Tables 15a, 15b). This vantage
point puts corporate farms into perspective since it describes them as a part of all farms
in the state. In 1974 corporate farms had their greatest shares in horticultural specialties,
where they accounted for almost one-fifth (17.6%) of all farms in that category, and
poultry and egg farms where they comprised just under one tenth (8.1 %) of all farms
(Table 15a). Their next largest shares of all farms were in vegetable/fruit and nut farms
and animal specialty farms where they comprised four percent and three percent
respectively.
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Table 15a. Proportions of Types of Illinois Farms by Production Specialty - 1974
Fann Specialty

Family

Grain Farms

90.4%

8.9%

.32%

.34%

Field Crops

93.4%

5.4%

.82%

.17%

Livestock

86.3%

12.9%

.57%

.22%

Dairy Farms

82.8%

16.7%

.34%

.14%

Poultry/Egg Farms

80.6%

10.7%

8.1%

.60%

General Farms

89.3%

10.1%

.43%

.15%

Animal Specialties

91.9%

5.0%

3.0%

--

Horticultural Specialties

67.7%

14.5%

17.6%

.17%

Vegetable, Fruit and Nut

86.0%

10.1%

3.8%

1.8%

Partnership

Corporation

Other

Table 15b. Proportions of Types of Illinois Farms by Production Specialty - 1987
Family
Non-Family
Corporation Corporation

Fann Specialty

Family

Grain Farms

85.5%

11.5%

2.1%

.16%

.76%

Field Crops

90.4%

7.0%

1.8%

.13%

.75%

Livestock

84.8%

12.9%

1.7%

.19%

.44%

Dairy Farms

73.7%

23.2%

2.2%

.15%

.74%

Poultry/Egg Farms

81.1%

12.3%

3.6%

2.3%

.66%

General Farms

87.6%

10.0%

1.7%

.20%

.53%

Animal Specialties

89.6%

6.9%

2.7%

.40%

.40%

Horticultural Specialties

57.8%

11.3%

25.8%

3.9%

1.3%

Vegetable, Fruit and Nut

84.7%

10.7%

3.8%

.43%

.43%

Partnership

Other

By 1987 Illinois corporate farms had increased their share of all horticultural
specialty farms to three tenths (29.7%) of these farms (Table 15b). Their share of poultry
and egg farms decreased to six percent while shares of vegetable/fruit and nut farms and
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animal specialty farms remained the same. Corporate farms slightly increased their share
of all other category by two percent or less.

Comparison of Corporate Farms in North Dakota and Illinois

As in North Dakota, Illinois corporate farms largest shares of all farms comprised
less risky agricultural production such as horticultural specialties, poultry and egg farms,
vegetable/fruit and nut farms. However, North Dakota and Illinois corporate farmers also
differ in their production patterns. Although cash grain farms form the highest proportion
of all corporate farms in both North Dakota and Illinois, four fifths of Illinois corporate
farms compared to only two fifths of North Dakota corporate farms are classed as cash
grain farms. North Dakota farmers have signifant shares of field crop production, e.g.,
potatoes, sugar beets, sunflower seeds, etc., while very few Illinois coporate farmers
raise field crops. In addition North Dakota corporate farmers are more likely to engage
primarily in livestock farming than Illinois corporate farmers.
While the relatively high proportions of corporate farms concentrating on cash
grain farming seemingly contradicts dependency predictions one has to remember that
II

II

classification as cash grain means 50 percent or more of sales comes from cash grain.
This leaves up to 50 percent of remaining sales to other agricultural commodities.
Drache's descriptions of corporate farmers who engage in cash grain farming indicates
these farmers have significant sales in at least one other commodity, usually livestock.
As pointed out earlier, many of these farmers hold some of the best land in the midwest
hence taking some of the risk out of cash grain farming. One could ·argue higher
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proportions of lliinois corporate farmers engage in cash grain farming because Illinois
climatic conditions make com and soybean farming less risky than North Dakota wheat
farming.
A more important consideration in both states, however, concerns the income
corporate farmers derive from other sources besides sale of agricultural goods. These
sources are many and varied. Drache's (1976) corporate farmers received noncommodities income through agricultural supply enterprises, e.g., agricultural
feed/seed/chemical dealerships or machinery dealerships; through agricultural service
provision, e.g., grain drying operations, custom combining enterprises; and through cash
income from renting out some of their vast land holdings to neighbouring farmers.
Drache's corporate farmers had also moved to increase their income from cash
grain by regaining control over the marketing of it. As pointed out previously, some of
them have their own elevators, rail sidings, and even grain agents. In addition, their
larger volume of production and alternate sources of income mean they can hold their
grain until market highs thereby selling for the best price. Smaller farmers don't have
this advantage. Generally they are so financially stretched over the production period they
must sell most or all of their crop at harvest to pay accumulated bills.
Therefore, dependency theorists predictions about capitalist farmers avoiding highrisk commodities would apply only if family farmers and corporate farmers produced
under equal natural and market conditions. From what Drache has described the
circumstances of corporate farmers differ markedly from family farmers. In terms of
natural conditions many midwestem farmers have better land and better climatic
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conditions than the average family farmer. In addition the nature of marketing
agricultural commodities in the United States, a system without any marketing boards,
gives the advantage to farmers who can control, somewhat, the marketing of their
produce. In the midwest it is corporate farmers who have greater marketing control since
they have enough capital to invest in direct marketing and enough alternate income to
wait for the best price before selling grain.
Smaller farmers have attempted to control grain marketing through co-operative
grain buying and marketing organizations. The most successful of these co-operative
endeavours came about in North Dakota in the late teens and early twenties when the
Non-Partisan League established producer owned elevators and lake-head grain terminals
along with a farmers' grain marketing company. The Non-Partisan League arrangements
prospered until the combined opposition of the major grain companies and the federal
government, through the efforts of its newly established Farm Bureau, finally
undermined the co-operative through boycotting its products on the Minneapolis grain
exchanges and outright Farm Bureau threats to farmers involved with the League (Russell
1975; Saloutus and Hicks 1951).
Because of a somewhat friendlier political environment, a tradition of co-operation
on the part of farmers, and a weaker grain merchant establishment western Canadian
grain producer co-operatives, established about the same time as the Non-Partisan League
enterprises, established a firm and lasting base. They still exist today and their early
members were instrumental in founding the Canadian Wheat Board.
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The Wheat Board, through its quota system and price averaging, gives smaller
grain farmers better prices than they would ever get in an uncontrolled market economy.
All farmers are subject to Wheat Board quotas - at any one time no farmer, no matter
what his/her volume, can sell more than the established quota for that period. All farmers
receive the same price per bushel. The Board determines the price by averaging the
prices it has received for wheat sales (on a national level) during the year. This takes
away any advantage of holding grain until market highs since the farmers would receive
the average price for it no matter when it was sold. Hence every farmer makes the same
amount per bushel. By averaging market highs and lows the Wheat Board negates the
disadvantage of being forced to sell at market lows, which many smaller farmers have
to do because they are cash poor by the end of harvest. The Wheat Board then acts as
an equalizer between all sizes of farmers at the marketing level. Although I have no data
on Canadian farm numbers and organization it's my guess that there would be less reason
to produce on the scale of corporate farms in the U.S. midwest since the Wheat Board
takes away the marketing advantages of large scale production.

Summing Up: The Overall Picture

The overall picture of agriculture in North Dakota and Illinois based on the
previous descriptions of segments of farming in both states from 1920 to 1987 is one of
change in some areas but of stability in others. Looking at changes first, today each state
has far fewer farmers than it did in 1920 and those farmers still in business operate farms
over twice as large as the average 1920 farm. While the decreases in farm numbers in
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both states have been substantial since 1974 each state experienced higher percentage
declines in farm numbers during the 1950's and 1960's.
In terms of ownership of farms, by 1987 farmers in both states were more likely
to be part owners than they were in 1920. One-half of North Dakota farmers and onethird of Illinois farmers were part owners, representing a 20 percent increase in partownership levels in each state over the 67 year period. Tenancy rates decreased in each
state but more noticeably in Illinois than in North Dakota.
The amount of off-farm work increased in both states. Today's farmers are more
likely to work off-farm and are also more likely to be employed virtually full-time in offfarm work than their 1920 counterparts. However, Illinois farmers showed higher rates
of off-farm work than North Dakota farmers. Not surprisingly, farmers with smaller
values of agricultural sales show higher levels of off-farm work. In addition, full-owners
and tenants work off-farm more than part-owners.
In 1987, as in 1920, farms in both states remain predominantly organized along
family lines. Over four-fifths of all farms in each state are family farms. Corporate farms
make up only a tiny proportion of all farms in each state although Illinois has higher
proportions of these farms than North Dakota. Furthermore, most corporate farms in
North Dakota and Illinois are family corporations with less than ten shareholders. Nonfamily corporate farms form a miniscule segment of all farms in both states. While the
percentage of Illinois corporate farms closely approximates that of the United States as
a whole, North Dakota's proportions fall under the national level.
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Corporate farms differ from family farms in the amount of hired labour they use
and in the commodities they produce. Corporate farmers use higher proportions of hired
labour than family farmers. Dollar amounts of hired labour have remained stable since
1950. However, from 1974 to 1987 the distribution of labour changed. In 1987 corporate
farmers hired a much larger share of agricultural labour than they had in 1974. Shares
for family farmers and partnerships dropped.
In terms of commodities production corporate farmers concentrate their production
more heavily in "controllable" commodities than family farmers. For instance, corporate
farmers are more likely to produce poultry and eggs, horticultural specialties, vegetables,
or fruit and/or nuts than family farmers. In North Dakota corporate farmers also show
a greater propensity than family farmers to raise field crops like potatoes and sugar beets
and to concentrate on livestock production.

CAN WE KEEP THEM DOWN ON THE FARM? FUTURE PROSPECTS
FOR AMERICAN FAMILY FARMERS

Of the three models used to explain agricultural development in capitalist
economies, the Chayanovian/dependency model best accounts for the changes in
agriculture in the two states I have examined. However, even this model fails to
illuminate some aspects of farming in North Dakota. In this concluding chapter I outline
the strengths of the dependency model as it applies to my data and point out some of its
deficiencies. I also examine future prospects for American farmers in light of the current
state of American agriculture.

Who's Still Out There?:
Numbers, Or~anization, and Specialization

From the data on farm numbers it's abundantly clear that both North Dakota and
Illinois, like the United States as a whole, have lost tremendous numbers of farmers since
1920. All three models predict this so in this respect neither of them lose credibility.
However, decline has been differential. Neither North Dakota or Illinois have suffered
as high a loss as the nation. Of the two states North Dakota evidenced the smallest
decrease in farm numbers. The dependency model is the only one that hints of
differential decline. Chayanov argued different ecological and conditions, e.g., climate,
soils, crops produced, and organizational conditions, e.g., labour power based on family
units as opposed to labour power based on hired labour, lead to different rates of change
in peasant and capitalist farm numbers. I tum now to possible explanations of lower farm
number decline in North Dakota.
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Fann Tenacity and Lifestyle: Willingness to Engage in Drudgery?

It is somewhat surprising, based on the statistics for farm production expenses and

market value of farm sales, that North Dakota had a lower rate of farm loss than Illinois.
From 1969 to 1987 North Dakota farmers had lower average values of sales and higher
average production costs than Illinois farmers. Given these statistics I would have
expected a higher rate of farm loss in Illinois. However, these statistics are averages and
necessarily obscure any variations among farms. It may be that the majority of North
Dakota farms have lower production costs than Illinois farms but a significant minority
have very high production costs and hence skew the average.
Other explanations besides statistical ones, however, come to mind. With the
industrial base in Illinois, farmers may have more opportunity for alternative
employment. Hence they may be less willing to stick with a relatively low paying farm
when they can get a higher paying industrial job. North Dakota has far fewer non-farm
employment opportunities. Approaching this apparent contradiction from a Chayanovian
perspective leads to a consideration of the farm family itself in terms of how it regulates
its consumption levels and allocates its labour power. It may be that North Dakota farm
families are more frugal than Illinois farmers in their personal consumption habits
thereby balancing lower sales and higher production costs with reduced personal
consumption.
Still another factor involves the work of other family members besides the farmer
since we are after all examining a family, rather than an individual, labour unit. I refer
specifically to the work of farm wives. It would help to know what percentages of farm
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wives in each state work off-farm not only to discover proportional differences in this
work, if any, but also to compare tenure of employment and rate of pay. I know my
cousins would have to reduce their personal consumption levels if their wives quit
working in town. All work full-time at lower middle-income, white-collar jobs. In the
area where my cousins live only one farm wife out of ten families does not work fulltime off the farm. Yet I know of no wives of the previous generation in that area who
worked off the farm.
On the other hand, perhaps North Dakota farmers have other sources of farmrelated income Illinois farmers don't rely on. The 1987 statistics on other farm-related
income show higher percentages of North Dakota farmers receiving income from gross
cash rent or share payments and other (non-specified) farm-related income sources.
Similar proportions of Illinois and North Dakota farmers received money from customwork and other agricultural services (twelve percent and eleven percent respectively).

State Support for Agriculture: Government Payments

The biggest difference in other farm-related income between Illinois and North
Dakota farmers was in government payments. In North Dakota 36 percent of all farmers
received government payments while in Illinois the corresponding proportion was 24
percent. North Dakota farmers also received higher average payments than Illinois
farmers. Of all those farmers eligible for government payments in North Dakota, the
average payment was $17,900 while in Illinois it was $15,688. If all government
payments are averaged over all farmers in each state North Dakota still comes out ahead
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with an average payment of $13,730 compared to an Illinois figure of $9,927. Of course
some of this difference may be due simply to the production levels of farms. For
instance, if North Dakota farmers, on average, produce more than Illinois farmers, then
they would be eligible for more subsidy payments, if, as I understand it, U.S.
agricultural subsidies are basically price supports and guarantee farmers a specific price
per unit of a specific commodity.
While family farmers in both states made up the highest proportion of farmers
receiving government payments, partnerships and corporations, relative to their
percentage of all farms receiving payments, got a higher share of transfer dollars than
their numbers warrant. For instance, in North Dakota corporations made up only eighttenths of one percent of all farms receiving government payments but they received
almost two percent of government payment dollars. Partnerships accounted for 11 percent
of all farms receiving government payments but garnered almost 15 percent of all
payments. This translates into an average government payment of $37,542 to each
corporate farm, $23,806 to each partnership, but only $17,014 to each family farm
collecting payments. The situation is similar in Illinois with the corresponding figures at
$35,818, $20,332, and $14,385. Again, the grouped census data obscures whether or not
government payments are fairly evenly distributed within these three farm classes or if
their distribution is irregular. Vogeler (1978) and Hightower (1978) argue the richest
U.S. farmers (those with highest sales) receive the lion's share of government payments
to agriculture. Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times (1978) researchers assigned about 80 percent
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of all government payments to the top 20 percent of income-recipients in agriculture in
the United States.
The data on agricultural subsidies points out a major deficiency in all three
models I have examined. Each neglects the role of the state in the development of
agriculture. While I can understand why Chayanov, Lenin, and early 19th century
economists failed to see the state as a major player in the agricultural arena, subsequent
researchers, especially those discussing the development of agriculture after WWII, must
necessarily take account of state "incursions" into the agricultural arena. Hightower
(1978) is one of the few recent researchers to undertake a detailed study of one aspect
of state intervention in American agriculture. He examines the role of agricultural land
grant colleges in promoting "big business" approaches to farming in the U.S. He
convincingly shows how these institutions, originally established to aid family farmers
and improve rural living conditions, became the tools of agribusiness rather than resource
centres for small, independent farmers.
Rural sociologists need to conduct analyses of state agricultural policy in terms
of the effects of government price supports, government credit schemes for farmers, and
agricultural export policy on the structure of agriculture. We need to know who benefits
the most from such state policy and whether or not such policies promote or discourage
specific types of farm organization, e.g., corporate as opposed to family organization.
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Who's Mindin~ the Farm?

The prevailing perception of the farm crisis in the mid-west portrays family
farmers as the chief victims of foreclosures. While this is true at a numbers level it is
also slightly misleading. The data for North Dakota and Illinois suggest that other types
of farm organizations, e.g., corporations, may be as susceptible to business failure as
family farms. The proportion of family farmers has remained stable in both states since
1920. If managed farms can be legitimately used as proxies for corporate farms then
"corporate farms" share of all farms has also remained stable. This suggests that family
and corporate farmers may be equally likely to "fail" in these states. Drache (1976) gives
a number of examples of capitalist farm failures in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
in North Dakota, Minnesota, and Iowa.
If family farms and capitalist farms go out of business at much the same rate then

this calls into question both Marxist and neo-classical models of the development of
agriculture in capitalist societies. Marxist arguments about the inability of the agricultural
petty bourgeoisie to survive advanced capitalism need rethinking since the "petty
bourgeoisie" still command by far the largest share of all farms in both North Dakota and
Illinois. However, the Marxist argument of monopolistic tendencies with advanced
capitalism is supported by drastically declining numbers of producers.
Neo-classical economists who argue corporate, capitalist organization is the most
"efficient" way to produce agricultural commodities also appear to be in error since their
corporate enterprises fare no better than family farm organizations in terms of
proportional survival. Even though Drache's corporate farmers have many advantages
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family farmers don't have, e.g., lower costs of input because of bulk buying, higher
prices for goods because of more market control, and in many cases, more fertile land
and better climatic conditions, they seem to be subject to rates of failure approximating
that of family farmers.
What has happened to both types of farms is a reduction in their numbers and,
at least with family farms, a major increase in size. There are monopolistic trends at
work here and they closely parallel traditional Marxist explanations for monopoly
developments in the industrial sector. Increases in the size of family farms have been
made possible by mechanization of much farm labour. So farmers, like businessmen,
have replaced live labour with dead. One Illinois or North Dakota farm family, with the
aid of machines, can now manage a farm two and one-half times as large as the farm one
family could work in 1920.

Rationale for Mechanization

While farm machinery has greatly reduced the labour intensive nature of
agriculture in the United States it has greatly increased it's capital intensive character.
However the reasons for such mechanization are slightly more complicated than the
Marxist argument of competition through mechanization. It may be that capitalist farmers
initially provided the market for much of this machinery and family farmers adopted the
technology as quickly as their pocketbooks would let them so compete effectively with
other mechanized farmers. However, the two world wars and heavy European
immigration to large American cities also promoted mechanization. World War I and
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World War II occasioned agricultural labour shortages and increased demand for
agricultural commodities abroad. At the same time massive immigration to the United
States swelled the urban population and increased the demand for food within the
country. Farmers had expanding markets and few helpers so they turned to machines. to
increase their production levels.
Mechanization then initially enabled family farmers to produce as much or more
on their farms without the amount of hired labour they previously had to rely on during
busy seasons. In the long run it also made it possible for a single farm family to handle
larger and larger numbers of acres on their own. Additional farm input materials such
as pesticides, herbicides, commercial fertilizers, and hybrid seeds also increased
production levels after World War II. The tremendous increase in acreage for the average
farm in both North Dakota and Illinois is in part a result of these technological changes.
However, mechanization began a "technological treadmill" for farmers. By
tremendously increasing productive levels it kept prices for agricultural commodities low
both during and after World War II. At the same time farm input prices kept rising.
Machinery, and fuel, and later pesticides, herbicides, fertilizer, and seeds all escalated
in price after farmers began using them and have continued to do so since WW II. Hence
farmers also got larger just to keep their income levels stable.
Hightower (1978) also documents land grant college "advice" to farmers to
mechanize. U.S. land grant colleges have encouraged family farmers to "over-equip"
their operations but unfortunately have done little to create machinery suitable for small
and medium scale farming (Hightower 1978:37). Land grant colleges have instead busily
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designing machinery modelled for very large acreages. At the time Hightower gathered
his data (the early 1970's) he estimated the mechanization research of land grant colleges
served only the largest-scale producers and was actually harmful to the majority of
independent producers, even those producers who had sales over $100,000 (Hightower
1978:36). Yet land grant colleges pushed this type of mechanization as a necessity and
developed no alternative technology for smaller farms.
Therefore American farmers' current reliance on agricultural machinery is
contingent upon a unique set of historical circumstances: agricultural labour shortages
occasioned by two world wars, the development of a class of large-scale producers,
continuing low commodities prices, and state supported research institutions which
encouraged all farmers to equip their operations with as much machinery as possible. The
result has been far fewer farms than in the past and far larger farms. While Marxist and
neo-classical economic theories correctly identify the move toward fewer and larger
farms they ignore the historical contingencies making this development possible. For
instance, if the Civil War, two world wars, and the Korean War would not have occurred
agriculture may have taken a completely different course of development. Similarly, if
agribusiness did not have the ear of land-grant colleges farmers may have not have been
encouraged to adopt mechanical and chemical inputs to the extent they now have.
Both Marxists and neo-classical economists posit "laws" of agricultural
development given a capitalist economy and ignore other impinging systems such as the
political situations within countries and throughout the world at any given time. Hence
their discussions of agriculture and its development generally ignore the effects of
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national and international political events on the agricultural sector. Some research in the
dependency vein, most notably that of Mann and Dickinson (1980), documents the unique
history of American agriculture. They attempt to show the inter-relationships between
U.S. internal military security (subduing American Indian tribes and securing the Spanish
southwest) and agricultural policy and expansion. The history of mechanization again
illustrates the crucial role the state plays in agricultural development either indirectly,
through its political alliances, or directly through its pressure on farmers to contribute
to national development by adopting specific production methods, e.g., mechanized to
increase the food supply.

Characteristics of the Mechanized Fanner

While Marxists and neo-classical economists predict a size polarization among
farmers this has not, as yet, occurred in either state. Rather most farmers remaining in
production have grown larger. The modal size category for farmers in both states is now
three size categories larger than it was in 1920. However, there is now less concentration
in particular size categories than in 1920. For instance, the 1987 modal size category for
Illinois contains 30 percent of all farmers compared to 56 percent in 1920. The 1987
modal size category for North Dakota accounts for 28 percent of all farmers but in 1920
the modal category contained 54 percent of all farms. So this "spreading out" of farmers
among size categories may indicate a polarization trend.
In addition there are growth differentials between family farms, partnerships, and
corporate farms. While family farms and partnerships have increased in size since 1969
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corporate farms, as a group, have actually become smaller on average. The fact that
corporate farms have lost acres since 1969 suggests two things: corporations are relying
on vertical integration to maintain profitability and/or corporations are concentrating in
commodities using less land, e.g., poultry and egg production. According to Drache's
data both things are happening. Hightower documents the highest levels of vertical
integration in agriculture in the poultry broiler industry and adds that agribusiness
companies such as Ralston Purina are pushing for vertical integration of the hog industry
(1978:43).
What seems to be happening is that corporate producers are coming to dominate
the production of commodities that lend themselves well to vertical integration and that
actual physical size of farms is not a good indicator of the importance of a farm. These
"dominated" commodities tend to fall into the "low risk" category of agricultural
produce. This finding supports the contentions of dependency theorists who argue high
risk sectors will be left to independent producers and low risk sectors will increasingly
come under the purview of corporate producers.
This leaves high-risk commodities production primarily to family farmers. Highrisk commodities also tend to bring lower returns in the market place, e.g, wheat as
opposed to potatoes, and hence farmers relying on production of such products probably
are under more pressure to increase their volume to keep up with rising costs. This may
account for much of the size increase in family farms. Rather than vertically integrating,
family farmers are relying on increased production through larger size to keep up their
farm income.
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Dependency theorists, however, do not go far enough in their analysis of lower
risk commodities. They argue low-risk commodities fall under the sway of corporate
producers because of the nature of the commodity, e.g., the commodity has inherent
qualities that make it easy to raise. They ignore the active efforts of corporate farmers
and agribusiness firms to create less-risky commodities or less risky environments for
producing commodities. For assistance in this endeavour corporate agriculturalists have
turned to researchers at land grant colleges. The researchers have obliged their requests
and concocted harder varieties of fruits and vegetables that incur less damage from
mechanical harvesting; come up with Ethylene, a chemical used to artificially ripen fruit
and vegetables picked "green" by these same mechanical harvesters; and pioneered the
use of the growth hormone DES (diethylstilbestrol) for cattle to speed up the
"maturation" rate of feedlot animals (Hightower 1978:47-50).
Even though land grant college research is primarily funded by tax dollars most
of it benefits neither the consumer nor the independent family farmer. In general most
land grant college research results in poorer quality products in terms of taste and
nutrition. In the case of DES it may actually create serious health risks for the public.
The primary beneficiaries are agribusiness interests who get their research done for
nothing and market the "innovations" at profitable prices. Therefore, land grant colleges
have speeded-up, and in some cases made possible, corporate production of agricultural
commodities. None of the models I examine take account of the political power structure
that makes possible such use of public funds raised by government taxation for the
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primary benefit of one small segment of the agricultural sector at the expense of family
farmers and consumers.

Part-Time Farmers

Both the Marxist and dependency models predict increases in farmers' off-farm
work levels with advanced capitalism but for different reasons. Marxist view these
increases as evidence farmers' loosening grip on their land. The result is inevitable - offfarm work eventually leads to total absorption into the industrial or rural proletariat as
the farmer finds he can no longer afford to keep his land.
Dependency theorists see off-farm work in two ways: as a survival strategy that
farmers use to get through tough economic times and then abandon when times get
better; and as a way of fully utilizing all the labour power available on the farm, e.g.,
if the farm does not require all one's attention then labour power is expended in another
area that brings in income.
Given the lack of data on who works off-farm and why an evaluation of the
Marxist and dependency evaluations is not possible. Some speculation, however, is in
order.
If off-farm work patterns are any indication of "commitment" to farm labour then
North Dakota farmers, whether out of choice or lack of alternative, do spend less time
working away from the farm than Illinois farmers. Obviously, Illinois farmers, if they
need or want to work off-farm, have more opportunity to find alternative employment
because of Illinois' industrial base. North Dakota farmers don't have the same
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opportunities. This may mean they are cash poor and hence have shied away from
agricultural "consumerism" in the form of machinery, vehicles, and other farm inputs.
Less heavy reliance on inputs in turn means farmers would be less affected by the costprice squeeze of escalating input prices and stagnant commodities prices.
The 1987 data on farm production expenses, however, shows North Dakota
farmers, on average, spent more on fertilizer, fuel, herbicides, and pesticides than Illinois
farmers. They also had higher interest payments. While I have no data that breaks down
expenses by size or sales of farm such analysis on inputs for both states is clearly needed
if we hope to understand farming strategies and differential rates of farm loss 1 •
Whatever the reasons for the difference 30 percent of Illinois farmers today are
really farming in their spare time, whereas only 15 percent of North Dakota farmers
spend this much time in off-farm work. These farmers generally have lower than average
agricultural sales and spend 200 or more days in the year working off the farm.
Unfortunately we're not sure who these farmers are in terms of other characteristics. It
would help to know their ages, the number of years they had farmed, their marital status,
and their production specialties.

1

These farm production expenses include: commercial fertilizer, petroleum products,
agricultural chemicals, interest expense, hired farm labour, feed for livestock and poultry, and
livestock and poultry purchased. The largest categories of expenditures for North Dakota are in
order of size: interest (12 %), fertilizer (10% ), petroleum products (10% ), agricultural chemicals
(8%), livestock and poultry purchased (7%), hired farm labour (5%), and feed for livestock and
poultry (4%) [totals 56% of all farm production expenses]. The largest categories of
expenditures for Illinois are in order of size: fertilizer (12%), livestock and poultry purchased
(10%), feed for livestock and poultry (10%), interest (10%), agricultural che~icals (7%),
petroleum products (7%), and hired farm labour (6%) [totals 62% of all farm production
expenses].
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would help to know their ages, the number of years they had farmed, their marital status,
and their production specialties.
For instance, if these farmers are young and just starting out one would interpret
the off-farm work in a more positive light, e.g., working to get established. However,
if these farmers have been in business for some years and are now resorting to off-farm
work the prognosis would be less rosy. One might surmise they worked off-farm to meet
more basic needs rather then to build-up the farm. A more neutral interpretation is that
farmers work-off farm do so to increase their income, not out of necessity to keep the
farm going, but because of a desire for money for extras.

Future Prospects for American Farmers

Given the historical record and the information on the current situation of
American farmers what can one say about the future prospects for family farmers in the
U.S.? I think they will continue to exist albeit in a different way than the family farmers
of the past. Although dependency farmers are pessimistic about the ability of family
farmers to resist the control of agribusiness through contract farming, and the control of
banks, through indebtedness there may be light at the end of the tunnel. There are
historical precedents and other recent, although non-American, research that indicates
somewhat different prospects for family farmers than that of either "semiproletarianization" or "propertied labourers".
Recent trends in the structure of agricultural production and the numbers of farm
foreclosures certainly present a gloomy picture of family farming although dependency
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theorists do present sound reasons for the continued existence of small, marginalized
farmers. The "cost-price" squeeze and recurring overproduction crises in agriculture have
pushed "less competitive farmers", for want of better terms, out of business. However,
a number of questions about agricultural development need to be examined before
researchers write family farmers off as destined for extinction or for significantly
degraded socio-economic status.
In the first place, researchers haven't analyzed which farmers are getting bigger
or how they are getting bigger and which farmers are getting smaller. Both traditional
Marxists and dependency theorists assume the bigger farmers are necessarily capitalist
farmers, meaning they primarily rely on wage workers to do most of the farm work. If,
as they claim, the increasing number of larger farmers rely more and more on wage
labour then one might expect to see an increasing number of agricultural wage workers
in areas where family farming once prevailed. But this has not been empirically
demonstrated. No researcher has yet looked closely at agricultural wage work on the
national level let alone at the regional level.
Although Pfeffer (1985a) argues that many part-time farmers engage in
agricultural wage labour for neighbouring farmers this is not so very different from the
"hired hands" of homesteading days who worked for more established (older) farmers
while at the same time farming their own land. This practice enabled them to put money
away to eventually buy more land. Therefore, part-time farming can also be viewed as
the road to full-ownership and full-time farming rather than a downward movement
towards the status of "propertied" labourer.
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The process by which larger farmers have consolidated their holdings and
continue to maintain viable operations also remains poorly understood. In terms of those
farmers who get larger, Marsden's (1982) data on British family farmers in North
Humberside indicates a "cannabilization" process in action. Wealthier farmers buy out
their less well-off neighbours in two situations: when they go out of business because of
foreclosures or when neighbouring farmers who have no heirs put their farm up for sale
so they can retire. However, Marsden's data also indicates the importance of kin
networks in farming and shows that in North Humberside the farmers who are most
successful, at least in terms of size, are not corporate farmers but those family farmers
who have extensive kin resources to help them farm.
The kin-network farming operation in North Humberside functioned with a
"collective" ethic in which family members committed themselves to maintain the
predominance of the family by continuing and expanding the farming enterprise. These
farming endeavours succeeded because the "collective" attitude of families promotes the
sharing of capital resources, technical skills, and managerial abilities (Marsden
1984:218). Sharing resources allowed such kin-based enterprises to increase their
superiority on the "treadmill of increasing farm size and capital investment" (Marsden
1984:218). They gained an advantage not only over small, "kin-isolated", farmers but
also over non-farm capitalists who try to enter the farming business without the collective
ethic and kin-based resources.
In North Humberside, then, strong family and kinship ties were the most
important factor in maintaining farm success. Kin networks provided the mechanism by
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which a class of large-scale, "family" farmers emerge. Lack of supporting kin-networks
explained the "marginalized" status of small farmers and the absence of capitalist farms
owned by non-family corporations. The extent to which this process may be occurring
in the U.S. is a subject for future research. Farm ownership data for the U.S. does show
that individuals and family corporations own the majority oflarge farms in the U.S., not
non-family corporations (U.S. Agricultural Census 1987). This suggests that a similar
process could be occurring here.
The family farms Marsden identifies may be no more in the best interests of
consumers or the farm community than non-family corporate farms. Such developments,
however, must lead us to ask new questions about increasing farm size and the types of
organization associated with it.
In addition to the lack of knowledge about which farmers get bigger, neo-classical
economics and Marxist models assume agriculture in capitalist economies follows a linear
developmental course. The movement is from small farms to large ones, from many
individually-owned farms to only a few, corporate-owned farms, and from unmechanized
farms to highly mechanized farms. Historical analyzes of agricultural development
suggest a non-linear pattern. Newby' s (1978) historical examination of British agriculture
shows suggests that agriculture can move from family farming to capitalist farming, and
then back to family farming again, depending on the price of land, the return on
investment in land, and the price of agricultural commodities, to mention only a few
factors. Similarly, high levels of mechanization are not only associated with capitalist
farms. In some cases capitalist farms are less mechanized than family farms.
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Mechanization may promote the maintenance of family farms in that machines enable
individual farmers to do all their farm labour on their own without hiring help.
A further factor operating in the agrarian sector is the movement towards an
energy-efficient, environ mentally sound agriculture. "Sustainable agriculture" has become
a buzz-word for environmentalists, concerned farmers, and green consumers. The extent
to which the demand for organically grown foodstuffs will influence the structure of
agriculture remains to be seen. Given that such produce requires intensive rather than
large-scale production a demand for it could give family farmers a shot in the arm.

It could lessen their dependence on agribusiness input industries for chemicals,
machinery, and fuel. Chemical inputs for farming such as herbicides, pesticides and
chemical fertilizer would no longer be used. Instead farmers would concentrate on cover
crops to control weed growth, lessen soil erosion, and provide green manure for their
fields. In turn, this type of farming would promote smaller-scale farming operations
thereby getting rid of the need for large-scale machinery and fossil fuels. Farmers could
instead concentrate on quality products and increasing production through soil
improvement. However, I don't believe green demand alone will be enough to totally
restructure agriculture in America. This is where the state could play a role through
environmental legislation to promote "environmentally friendly agriculture".
Whatever the agricultural result of green demand I would argue that agriculture,
as it is now practiced in this country, is in danger of environmental collapse. We use too
much energy to produce too little food. We have compromised our seed bases by too
great a reliance on too few hybrids. Soil degradation is a continuing problem. Large
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machinery like four-wheel drive tractors compacts soil, irrigation causes soil salinity and
depletes groundwater resources, and chemical fertilizers in no way make up for the more
complex nutrients provided by cover crops and animal manure.
Family farmers seem the most likely to switch to sustainable agriculture simply
because they have the most to gain from it. It would alleviate their input-cost pressures
and might allow them greater control over marketing if they dealt through green
consumer networks like food co-ops and sustainable agriculture networks. The extent to
which family farmers can take advantage of the increasing organic produce demand and
organize themselves as sustainable agriculturalists may be a key factor in their survival
in the American economy.
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